

UNINSURED BY CHOICE ■ SE HABLA ARABIC? ■ STRANGLING GAZA

JULY 16, 2007

# The American Conservative

## A Righter Shade of Green

By Roger Scruton

## A SOLDIER REFLECTS

Regarding Kara Hopkins's "Stupid Party" (June 18), I too have been thinking about the exchange between Rudy Giuliani and Ron Paul about 9/11. I have been a lifelong Republican and have been a supporter of the war, which I can back up with a Department of Defense DD Form 214 showing my service in Iraq. After quite a lot of reflection, I still hold the same beliefs about why we are at war. However, my sense of how we should be fighting it has changed.

I voted for Bush in 2004 because I couldn't vote for a guy who openly admitted to committing atrocities in Vietnam while he was an officer and should have had the leadership and moral courage to stop. And I supported the war because both Clinton and Bush told us there were WMD. God help our civil liberties if Saddam drops one of those on an American city, I thought, though I was not of an interventionist mindset. (I believe that all of our soldiers should have returned to within the U.S. borders after the end of the Cold War.)

I served my tour in Iraq after it was clear the WMD would never be found and stood by my helicopter and saluted with tears in my eyes as the body bags containing the remains of my fellow GI's (some weighting less than 30 pounds) were loaded.

As I crisscrossed thousands of square miles of Iraq, I had high expectations about the country becoming free and prosperous. I was there for the first two elections and hoped with all my soul that they would quit killing each other and, of course, us. After I got out of the country, I followed the news every day, searching for some hint that the violence was abating. I listened in vain. We cannot install a democracy there. The hatred is so deep that we would have as much luck invading Lebanon, Palestine, and Israel, combining them into one country, and having them vote in one democracy.

Every great general in history knew when he had lost a battle and had sense enough to withdraw, regroup, and

rethink his strategy. Once soldiers see that they are dying in vain, a general rapidly lose the support of his men—and even more so when he is giving orders from the rear. It doesn't help when they know he didn't spend time in the foxholes in his youth.

If Americans believe we are at war with all of Islam or we are at war to keep the oil flowing, then we had better buckle down and fight all out like WWII. Quit trying to pretend that we can go on enjoying peacetime lives while tossing a few sons and daughters toward a far-off battle. It is going to take a lot of bodies to kill 1.5 billion Muslims.

If, however, as I believe, we are at war with a radical few, then we need to get out of the Middle East and deprive al-Qaeda of the rallying and recruitment point American occupation provides. Those thinking I have become an appeaser and pacifist could not be more wrong. It is my firm belief that all things in this universe are about force and counterforce and the struggle to survive. Terrorism will always be with us, and I will fight without hesitation for my freedom and right to live, but war is a ghastly thing that brings out the worst elements of human nature. If we can find different strategies that cost fewer lives and defuse the constant human struggles wherever possible, we must go that route.

I was wrong about the war and have to admit my mistake. As I look around for a leader to replace Bush, I have to go back and see who was making sounder judgments than I during the time of 9/11 hysteria. It wasn't any of the "top tier candidates," Democrat or Republican. That person was Ron Paul.

JOEL (LAST NAME WITHHELD)  
Via e-mail

## POLITICS IS EVERYTHING

In the Deep Background column of June 18, Karl Rove is cited as saying that an attack on Iran will cause catastrophic U.S. gas prices, which would damage Republican political prospects

in 2008 and reduce President Bush's approval ratings to single digits. This line of thinking is exactly why the U.S. is in decline: politicians are only interested in staying in power, regardless of the cost to the nation.

When will Rove and company concentrate on rebuilding our manufacturing base, ending illegal immigration, finding bin Laden, improving healthcare, reducing the national debt, and developing an exit strategy from Iraq? Never, because they do not represent the true spirit of America. They are just power-hungry tyrants.

DAVID L. EILERING  
Glen Carbon, Ill.

## A CAPITAL QUESTION

Richard Silverstein's review of *The Fight for Jerusalem* (July 2) concludes that designating East Jerusalem as the capital of a Palestinian state is justified and would be a significant overture to solving the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. He overlooks the fact that for 19 years—1948 to 1967—the Palestinians had 100-percent control of East Jerusalem (and the West Bank) but made no effort to designate it the capital of a Palestinian state.

Such indifference to East Jerusalem's status is exemplified by the fact that, while Jordan's King Hussein made two trips to East Jerusalem during those 19 years, no leader of the other 21 Arab nations deemed it worthy of a visit. And also let us not ignore a significant theological point that while the word "Jerusalem" is mentioned more than 600 times in the Bible, it does not appear once in the Koran.

NORMAN MEYERSON  
Via e-mail

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[MEDIA]

## LAPDOGS OF WAR

Faced with evidence that the surge in Iraq is not accomplishing its objectives, the Bush administration has launched a new effort to shore up political support for the war. The tactic is linguistic redefinition. Now, instead of fighting Iraqi insurgents, terrorists, Saddam loyalists, Shi'ite extremists, "dead-enders," or the tellingly imprecise term employed by many U.S. soldiers, "bad guys," the Bushites seek to convince Americans that we are fighting al-Qaeda in Iraq, apparently a Baghdad branch office of the group that attacked us on 9/11.

Thus in May, President Bush began talking up the idea that "al-Qaeda is public enemy number one in Iraq," using the term 27 times in one Iraq speech. The pro-war media has shamelessly played along. Blogger Glenn Greenwald has chronicled how the *New York Times'* Michael Gordon parrots the administration's claims, writing about American offensives against "Qaeda leaders," "Qaeda strongholds," and "Qaeda fighters." Other outlets have followed suit, though military analysts note that the al-Qaeda portion of the insurgency is no greater than it ever was and that the overwhelming majority of insurgents are native Iraqi Sunnis and Shi'ites.

Greenwald notes that the al-Qaeda label has even been adopted retrospectively: the *Times* now claims that the 2004 battle of Fallujah was aimed at capturing "top Qaeda leaders," a fact the paper somehow neglected to mention when the battle was going on and it correctly labeled Fallujah fighters as Iraqi Sunnis.

The administration has tried a version of this bait-and-switch before, when it went to great effort to convince Americans that Saddam Hussein was in cahoots with the 9/11 hijackers. Since then we have heard from many politicians and pundits lamenting that they were "misled" by administration claims



prior to the Iraq War. So to see the media again rush to market a different version of the same patently dishonest argument is more than disappointing.

[ELECTION]

## A CHOICE, NOT AN EGO

Michael Bloomberg's announcement that he's switching his party registration to Independent set off a flurry of speculation. A third-party challenge seems particularly enticing in 2008. David Broder summed up the mood in the electorate: "there is a palpable hunger among the public for someone who will attack the problems facing the country—the war in Iraq, immigration, energy, health care—and not worry about the politics."

Neither the Republican president nor the Democratic Congress evoke fond feeling: Bush's approval rating sits at 31 percent; Congress's at 25. The country voted in 2006 hoping to bring our troops home. Instead we got a surge. Polls show that only 20 percent of the public approves of "comprehensive immigration reform," yet leaders of both parties insist that opponents don't want to do the right thing for America.

The natural third party would be

socially conservative and economically populist, a party of the middle class. The political opportunity of the coming election is to challenge a foreign policy that has found support in the elites of both parties—and nowhere else.

It thus seems like a cruel joke that the most likely candidate is a pro-choice, pro-war, open-borders billionaire who offers voters nothing but the threat of self-financing his ego. It's enough to make a thinking observer question a system that claims to be democratic, yet becomes less representative with each election.

[2008]

## SKIP OUT, SNORT UP

June dealt the Giuliani campaign a one-two punch. First newspapers reported that the "Mayor of 9/11" had skipped out on the meetings of the Iraq Study Group because they interfered with his public-speaking schedule. After Giuliani begged off two panel meetings—one to make a \$100,000 speech in Atlanta, the other in favor of a \$200,000 address in South Korea—Study Group leaders asked him to show up or resign. He left.

It's understandable that Rudy might prefer making money to participating in

difficult foreign-policy discussions. Tough-guy campaign slogans come more easily when you don't think much about military and political realities. But the mayor, whose campaign is more or less based on his aura of leadership and command after the terrorist attacks, really has no foreign-policy experience or reservoir of knowledge. The Iraq Study Group could have given him some.

Well, you might say, maybe he doesn't know much about foreign policy, but surely he could find people to advise him. The other shoe that dropped that week reminded voters that Rudy's choice of associates isn't a strong suit either. In New York, he was very tight with Bernie Kerik, a driver whom he appointed police commissioner and then recommended to the president to head the Department of Homeland Security. Not only did Kerik's bid not stand up to the White House's vetting process, Rudy's police commissioner has recently been told to expect indictment on federal charges. But that's old news.

The hotter headline is that Giuliani's South Carolina chairman, Thomas Ravenel, has been indicted on cocaine distribution charges, and since South Carolina is a key date in the GOP primary season calendar, it's hardly a casual position.

All in all, it's a news cycle Giuliani would surely prefer to forget. We expect his rivals will find ways to prevent that.

#### [EXECUTIVE]

### DECIDER'S CONSTITUTION

Just because he signs a law doesn't mean George W. Bush plans to abide by it. A new Government Accountability Office inquiry reveals that the president's prodigious use of signing statements nullified 30 percent of the appropriations acts passed last year. And he wasn't hunting small game. Bush exempted his administration from complying with torture prohibitions, war accounting, and border-protection provisions.

Pressed to explain the president's "for thee but not for me" behavior, White House spokesman Tony Fratto said, "The signing statements assert the president's understanding of how the law should be executed, pursuant to his understanding of the Constitution." The notion of George W. Bush as a Constitutional scholar may be more troubling than his selective compliance.

#### [EUROPE]

### WE THE BUREAUCRATS

On June 23, at 4:30 a.m., the heads of the 27 member countries of the European Union agreed to negotiate a treaty that will serve as a constitution. It says much about the current state of European unity that this putative foundational document was the product of last-minute deals in the EU's back rooms (presumably not smoke-filled due to strict regulation).

Two years ago, a proposed EU constitution met with resounding defeat in referendums in France and Holland. This time around, the European Commission found it easier to simply negotiate a treaty without bothering to ask for public consent.

Brussels wields great power in the economic and regulatory realm. But "Europe" seems to be emerging as a kind of bureaucracy in search of a state, and is more a colossal waste of time and money than a fearsome empire about to gobble up national sovereignty and culture.

If anything, the treaty represents diminished expectations. Language defining principles for the regulation of the economy have been left out, and while there is a foreign-policy chief, he does not hold the power of a foreign minister. The fact that Beethoven's "Ode to Joy" was dumped as the supra-national anthem is symbolic of the European Union's lack of unity. But then for those who seek to protect their rights and heritage, a state of division and ambiguity might not be that bad of an outcome. ■

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[a charge to keep]

# *A Righter Shade of Green*

While the Left pursues environmentalism to advance its global agenda, conservation is best entrusted to local stewardship.

**By Roger Scruton**

CONSERVATISM IS ABOUT preserving intrinsically valuable things—economic capital, social capital, and natural capital. I use the word “capital” deliberately, for its opponents say that conservatism is nothing but the apologetics of capitalism. That is absolutely right—provided you understand that capital embraces many things that are not translatable into economic terms.

So why have conservatives been so slow to capture the environmental cause and the agenda that has been built around it? And why have their opponents been so eager to prevent them?

First, the damage done to our environment is connected in many people’s thinking, and to a great extent in reality, with the activities of business. You don’t do damage if you are not interested in changing things, and the usual reason people change things is to make a profit. And undoubtedly some of the big players in various markets that impact the environment have been extremely unscrupulous—even if their profits usually depend on their ability to meet demands made by the rest of us.

The second reason the environmental cause has been avoided on the Right is that ecological degradation is on the whole a byproduct of prosperity. After all, when people are too poor to turn the world in their favor, they leave the environment alone. And prosperity is a

product of capitalism, the old enemy of the Left. To be a right-wing environmentalist is to risk obscuring what was once a clear confrontation, and who, at a time of confusion, wants to do that?

There is a third and I think more interesting motive for the Left’s capture of the environmental cause: the cult of the victim. There has been a tradition on the Left, going back to the 19th century and to Marx in particular, of judging every form of human success in terms of its victims. It is assumed that when someone makes a profit, someone else must suffer a loss. This idea of human society as a kind of zero-sum game, in which every benefit is matched by someone else’s cost, is dear to a certain kind of left-wing thinking. And in the Earth, we have a wonderful victim—one bigger than any human being, who suffers the results of all of our profiteering.

The fourth reason the environmental movement has been appropriated by the Left is that it is a paradigm of a global cause. What is going wrong with the environment is going wrong everywhere. The world is an interlocking and mutually adapting system. If there is damage in one place, it will emerge in another. There seem to be no solutions to environmental problems that don’t involve transgressing national boundaries and linking people across the globe. This connects to a longstanding

desire on the Left to abolish nations and national governments—those centers of loyalty and power that seem to be at the heart of human conflicts—and to replace them with some kind of transnational, multinational, or even global government.

The most articulate environmentalist in Britain, George Monbiot, is also a well-known advocate of global democracy. He tries to envisage institutions that might work on the global level, so as to absorb information from every relevant source of data around the globe and deliver a single collective solution. This recalls the old Communist Party agenda, explicitly stated by Marx. For Marx, the nation-state is made necessary by the local needs of capitalist exploitation and would vanish once the proletariat, the victim class, unites across the world.

Environmental issues seem to lend themselves to statist solutions. The problems seem so large, so diffuse, so without local definition that the only way to solve them must be by some gesture of control from above in which enlightened intellectuals direct the benighted profiteers. That is a cherished motive on the Left: the hope that progressives will be able to take hold of the state and use it to dictate to the rest of humanity, supposedly for the benefit of everyone.

There are religious feelings behind such conceptions; as with communism, the environmental movement has also crystallized into a faith. One form is James Lovelock's famous Gaia hypothesis, which presents the Earth as both an object of care and of worship. It is not that Gaia is a person exactly: persons are poisonous. Nevertheless it, or she, is an organism of which we are all parts—the source of life and the highest form of life. Mother Earth fills the place vacated by God, though in the form of a goddess wounded by our mortal carelessness.

Religious aspects also emerge in what one might call the *odium theologicum* of the environmental movement. “Theological hatred” was a phrase coined in the Middle Ages to denote the mutual antipathy to which theologians were tempted by their tiny disagreements about matters that could be neither resolved nor understood by rational argument. We have seen this kind of hatred in the leftist movements in Europe and especially in communism, which was preoccupied with heresies: deviationism, Left infantilism, social fascism, Trotskyism, and so on. Mao Tse Tung was particularly good at inventing heresies of this kind. And being denounced as a heretic was very bad news: you often paid with your life.

Environmentalists are not quite as vindictive. Nevertheless, we have seen sustained vilifications of people who have been judged heretical. The Danish environmentalist Bjørn Lomborg, who may be completely wrong and probably is, caused a scandal in the environmentalist movement by saying that many of its favorite theses, such as global warming, have not been established. Rather than engaging with his contribution, as scientists do, the environmental movement in Europe has tried to silence him. He has been marginalized by his own university and not allowed to speak in its name, and anti-Lomborg websites

come up on Google well in advance of sites that include his justifications for his controversial positions.

This kind of heresy hunting appears wherever beliefs become locked into a form of social membership. To give up such beliefs is to give up your home—to become a lonely wanderer in the world. That is why religions are much more interested in killing heretics than those who entirely reject the faith. The heretic is the enemy within, the one who disrupts the comforts and certainties of home.

Environmentalism certainly has the character of a movement, something you join that offers membership. It also has a militant wing. Aggressive organizations like Greenpeace, corrupt and unaccountable though they are, nevertheless appeal to young people because of their image of purity. Their publicity says, “Join us, and we will offer you salvation from environmental sin.” The redemption that they offer resembles initiation promises throughout history, from the knightly orders of the Middle Ages through to the jihadists today.

Left-wing movements appeal because they offer three things that people need. They promise a justifying cause, in the form of a victim to be rescued. In the 19th century, we rescued the proletariat, and then in the 1960s, we rescued youth. We rescued women, and then we rescued animals. Now we rescue the Earth itself—a cause so noble as to justify all activities performed in its name.

These movements also provide an enemy, and enemies are useful for defining your place in the world. While it is difficult to share friends, you can easily share enemies, since hatred is far less demanding than love and requires no shared judgment—only a common target.

Such movements provide a dynamic experience of belonging, in which you are engaged in doing something and doing it collectively. They offer a balm for loneliness and alienation.

On the other hand, they exemplify what Engels, following Hegel, referred to as the “labor of the negative.” The cause is too vague or vast or beyond the reach of human nature to form itself as a concrete goal. The only certain thing is the enemy you can destroy rather than the goal you can achieve.

This explains why crimes committed in left-wing causes tend to be excused or overlooked, while misdemeanors on the Right, however identified, are impossible to live down. Compare the careers of György Lukács and Martin Heidegger. Lukács was a very clever literary critic, who took part in the Communist revolution in Hungary after World War I and joined the government of Béla Kun. As a political commissar, he was responsible for purges, executions, and cultural suppression. When Kun's government was overthrown, he fled to Vienna, returning after World War II to assist the revolutionary Communist government in purifying Hungary of dissident intellectuals. His career is one long history of crime and deception, yet he has been consistently revered as a leading left-wing thinker: the person who showed us how to apply Marxism to literary criticism and how to understand literature as a genuinely revolutionary force.

Heidegger was also involved in totalitarian movements, though never in government. He joined the Nazi Party and was made a rector of his university by the Nazis. After the war, he was disgraced for this and has never really been rehabilitated. Given the left-wing myth that Nazism was “on the right,” the explanation is simple: Heidegger belonged to the wrong set of criminals.

Likewise, when a radical Left movement becomes discredited, there is seldom an act of penitence. There is rather a sideways migration to another movement with the same emotional structure. During the '70s and '80s, therefore, as the reality of communism

could no longer be denied, people began to migrate from red to green.

The problem is that when an important issue like the environment gets captured by a left-wing movement, this disrupts the possibility of developing a proper political approach. Fertile disagreement gives way to imposed orthodoxy and viable solutions to impossible utopias. Political approaches are distinguished by the fact that they have no single goal. A political solution is worked out by taking into consideration all the competing interests and trying to reconcile them. Its characteristic outcome is a compromise, not an absolute dictate.

For this reason, political approaches don't identify enemies. Unlike revolutionary movements, they are not conceived in quasi-military terms. They try to initiate a discussion against a background of social unity and social harmony, such as is provided by shared membership in a single nation-state. Working for a political solution means working for a *modus vivendi* among competing interests. The political process does not offer membership in any dynamic sense. Unlike movements that say, "Join us, and you will be redeemed," political approaches say, "We are assuming that we are all citizens together. Let's sit down and work out a solution acceptable to each of us."

One problem with allowing the environmental cause to be captured by the Left, therefore, is that it is then radicalized and cast as a movement. This tends to militate against the possibility of genuine political solutions. And when radical movements enter the political arena, they also have a natural tendency to move in a statist direction. There is a collective goal, which is to rectify all environmental damage, to return the Earth to its equilibrium. Collective goals require collectivist policies, and when the plan for achieving them is put in the hands of bureaucrats, it promptly ceases to be adaptable.

As Mises and Hayek pointed out some 80 years ago, plans in the hands of the state do not adapt to changes in their information base. We saw this with the Communist five-year plans, which were never fulfilled, and also with the planned economies of Western Europe, most of which are now close to collapse. Although most of the communist economies have vanished, we know that communism has been the cause of far greater ecological disasters than we have witnessed under capitalism. Nor is this surprising. When the state takes charge of everything, it is not possible to effectively oppose or adjust its plans. Gargantuan projects, like the diversion of rivers in the Soviet Union, were forced on people who were unable to protest. And this weakness in the statist approach of communism is replicated in some capitalist economies—notably here in the United States with the unscrupulous and often corrupt use of eminent domain.

The desire to take charge in this statist way is precisely what we don't need, for it requires concentration of power in a single agency, which then becomes the greatest threat to the environment. No economy based on private enterprise could ever have embarked, for example, on the Nile dams, which not only destroyed vast archeological treasures and the ecology of the lower Nile, but also did nothing to produce the power that was promised to the Egyptians.

The real cause of the environmental problems we face is not so much large private enterprises or the pursuit of profit or even capitalism as such. It is the habit we all have of externalizing our costs. Consider air travel. If somebody offers you cheap flights, you will take them rather than the more expensive flights offered by a company that puts some of its profits into rectifying the environmental damage caused by airplanes. This is human nature: we try to

ignore the damage done by our unnecessary journeys by air if someone else bears the cost of them.

Similarly, suburbanization forces millions to go to work in cars everyday when they might have been walking. It requires vast acreages of the countryside to be covered with buildings and roads, destroying natural ecosystems. Yet it goes ahead because it is something that people want, and the cost can be easily externalized onto other generations or people in other parts of the world.

Then there is nondegradable packaging. Those who live in cities don't see the effect of this because street-cleaners gather it up and push it into landfill sites. But in the countryside, where trash blows around unpursued, you see it in every yard—a plastic bottle or a piece of packaging—and you can foretell that since these bits of rubbish are immortal, one day the entire world will be covered with a layer of plastic, and there will be no life beneath it.

Normally, if someone tries to force another person to bear the cost of his own misdemeanors, that other person retaliates, either by filing a lawsuit or by throwing the rubbish back over the fence. This conflict immediately opens the way to political solutions. If two people are in conflict, and if they have been brought up in a democratic culture, they will recognize that the best way to solve their problem is through a sustainable compromise rather than a lawsuit or a shootout.

For instance, there are no rubbish collections in Rappahannock County, Virginia, where I live. People were in the habit of dumping trash wherever they could find a hole, sometimes even leaving it in the fields. One of the good things about nondegradable wrappings, however, is that they soon become eyesores. So residents decided to do something about it. They established the Rappahannock Dump and invited people to bring



their stuff, with a view to exchanging what was usable, recycling what was convertible, and burying the rest. Neighbors recognized immediately that this was a solution to what was otherwise a potentially inflammatory conflict.

There are more sophisticated examples worth considering—the bicycle regime in Amsterdam, for instance. At a certain point, it became so obvious that cars were ridiculous that all the canals were turned into bicycle lanes. Cars can go along them if they really have to, but what happened instead was that all Dutch people from 5-year-old schoolchildren to 80-year-old grandmothers got onto bicycles. They are fiendishly dangerous to pedestrians—it is the only aspect of Dutch culture that seems to give full scope to aggression—but nevertheless, it has solved the problem of transportation in Amsterdam in a way that has also preserved the city's ecology.

English planning laws are another example. They were a compromise solution to the sudden growth of population between the wars and the increasing prosperity that enabled people to move out of cities and build houses along the roads. People were appalled by this for a variety of good and bad reasons. Aristocrats were disquieted to see ordinary people presuming to own a piece of land, a gesture of unprecedented vulgarity compounded by plaster gnomes in the kitschy flowerbeds and dreadful lace curtains in the windows. City dwellers were also horrified because they could no longer gain access to the countryside. Every road was simply another extended ribbon of houses, each forbidding visual access to the fields behind, while businesses were fleeing to the edges of the cities causing the town centers to decay both economically and socially. Farmers, too, were unhappy. Farmland was being destroyed, fields were being broken up in agriculturally unsustainable ways, and

**Warren Bamford, the special agent in charge of the FBI field office in Boston, has warned local universities to be on the alert for spies and potential terrorists who might be trying to steal sensitive research information.**

Bamford's office has met with representatives of the major universities in the Boston area, including Harvard, MIT, University of Massachusetts, and Boston College. The FBI reportedly informed the university administrations that professors, students, and security staff should be trained to identify attempts to access information that is technically unclassified, but can be used for illegal purposes. The FBI is legitimately concerned that some radical foreign students might be attempting to obtain information from the college biological or chemical research labs that could enable a terrorist attack, but there is no evidence to suggest that terrorists have actually infiltrated any American university science department. The Boston-based initiative will reportedly become nationwide soon, with local FBI offices contacting all major research institutions. Most thefts of university proprietary information are in fact carried out directly from unprotected computers, not through classrooms or laboratories. According to experts on economic espionage, students and visiting academics who come from countries that are U.S. economic competitors like China and India systematically acquire sensitive information that can be used for commercial purposes.



**In a private meeting with Republican insiders held in early June, presidential aspirant Rudy Giuliani stated that he is opposed to deadlines for withdrawal from Iraq**

because you "don't provide your enemies with a timetable when you are retreating."

Giuliani's comments were interpreted to mean that he knows the Iraq War is unwinnable, a view at odds with the hard-line positions that he has been taking in the first two presidential debates. The comment might well be related to the growing Republican perception that the party must somehow disengage from the Iraq problem if it is to have any chance in the 2008 elections.



**President Bush's former adviser, the irrepressible Karen Hughes, now in charge of public diplomacy at the State Department, has launched a new international program**

to counter the dissemination of terrorist ideology and to enhance the reputation of the United States. Hughes, who has little experience of the world outside Texas and Washington, has formed the Counterterrorism Communications Center at the State Department to develop a plan to undermine extremists. The 34-page strategy paper outlining the proposed activities of the center appears unusually naïve, even given the admittedly low standards established by recent attempts to explain America's position in the world. It emphasizes the United States' central role in promoting democracy worldwide and holds up the U.S. as a role model, but it does not attempt to address world media accounts of human-rights abuses by the administration, something that is much on the minds of the target audience. Hughes is earnest and trying hard to articulate a useful strategy, but this latest gambit is akin to launching a major advertising campaign to promote a product that has no obvious market and has been cited for serious manufacturing defects.

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rental costs were soaring as speculative builders made bids for the tracts by the roads.

The solution—agreed upon by the political parties and still in operation—was the Town and Country Planning Act of 1946, which had the consent of the majority and was an attempt to reconcile the conflicting interests. New development in towns was to be within the city limits, and towns were to be surrounded by a green belt. There should be no development in the countryside except that legitimately required by farming.

Such cases show people working together toward an environmental compromise, solving problems politically rather than through dictatorship, and recognizing the imperfect nature of political solutions and the impossibility of utopias. There is a deeper problem, however, that politics cannot, in itself, address.

Political solutions represent agreements among the living, but our real problems are transgenerational. At present, we are externalizing our costs not to people who can complain but to unborn people who can't. Democratic politics, Burke and Chesterton pointed out, has an inbuilt tendency to disenfranchise the unborn and the dead.

So what is to stop us from externalizing our costs onto future generations? Within our own families, we recoil from doing such a thing. I don't want to dump the costs of my life on my son, even though I shall be dead when he feels them. Nor would I wish my grandchildren to pay the price of my selfishness.

It is here that I think we Anglophone conservatives can show our relevance. The common law of England developed, through the branch known as equity, a concept that has no real equivalent in Napoleonic or Roman legal systems: the concept of the trust. Trusteeship is a form of property in which the legal owner has only duties, and all rights are transferred to, and "held in trust for," the

beneficiary. Through the device of the trust, English and American law has been able to protect the interests of absent generations by compelling the current owners of property to set their own interests aside. The trustees of a bequest must respect the wishes of the testator and in so doing—by holding their own desires and present emergencies in abeyance—will serve the interests of future generations. This form of ownership, and the moral idea contained in it, ought to be regarded as defining the conservative approach. We don't solve environmental problems by abandoning our attachment to private property or free enterprise, but we can make sure that these notions are shaped by the spirit of trusteeship.

In response to Rousseau's doctrine of the Social Contract, Burke agreed that society is, indeed, a contract. But it is a contract between the living, the unborn, and the dead. We mistreat the unborn when we take away the legacy that they are entitled to inherit, and we mistreat the dead by regarding ourselves as the sole proprietors of the things that they have left to us. In ignoring and despising the dead, we traduce the unborn: such, for Burke, was the lesson of the French Revolution, and it is a lesson repeated in our times by the revolutionary movements of the 20th century.

In *A Political Philosophy*, I wrote,

When Burke invoked our feelings towards the dead, he was placing in the center of political order a universal emotion which, he believed, could safeguard the long-term interests of society. But this motive extends no further than our local and contingent attachments. Through institutions of membership and the 'little platoons' that shape our allegiances we can extend our social concern beyond our immediate family. Neverthe-

less, the sense of a shared inheritance does not extend to all mankind, and the respect for the dead – which is the respect for *our* dead, for those who have made sacrifices on our behalf – peters out at the social horizon where 'we' shades into 'they.'

I went on to say why, therefore, we still have a problem:

Modern societies are societies of strangers. And one of the underlying conservative projects in our time has been to discover the kind of affection that combines such societies together across generations, without risking fragmentation along family, tribal, or mafia lines. Hence the importance, in conservative thinking, of the nation and the nation state.

Environmental protection, like charity, begins at home. Treaties like the Kyoto Protocol will have no effect if we have not already resolved to keep our house in order. Moreover, treaties entered into with dictatorships have a completely different meaning from treaties with democracies. There is no way in which the Chinese authorities are going to enforce an environmental treaty against themselves, and if they condone its enforcement against others, it will be because they see a competitive advantage. An environmental treaty with the Swedes, however, is quite a different matter. They will try to outdo us by showing how clean they are.

Under Mao's leadership, China threw away all of its social capital—its culture, its philosophy, everything it knew—because Big Brother told it to. China has come a long way since the Cultural Revolution, but what guarantee have we, in a state without opposition and with only patchy caricatures of law, that it won't do with its ecological capital what it did

with its social capital? China has the most wonderful collection of mountains and rivers and forests, but there is little or no attempt to protect these things. Crazy dam projects, deforestation, uncontrolled pollution, and the relentless construction of coal-fired power stations all contribute to the destruction of the Chinese environment, while state-controlled agriculture propels the rapidly advancing desertification of the north. Nor are the towns protected. Old Shanghai is designated a “historic district” not to be destroyed, but street after street is demolished to make room for whatever gigantesque project has captured the whim of the politburo. In the face of decisions made at the top, the ordinary Chinese is powerless, and there is nothing to which appeal can be made that will shield him from reprisals should he protest. Not surprisingly, therefore, the attitude of trusteeship has gone. If one day it returns, it will not be the result of an international treaty but because the Chinese have regained their freedom and with it the respect for the dead and the unborn that is the natural byproduct of freedom.

What then is the conservative solution, if there is one? A revival of trusteeship is the only hope for the future, and this attitude is natural to human beings. They enter the world through no choice of their own, to be greeted, as a rule, by the love of parents and the security of home. The trustee is the one who recognizes that his home, and all that it means, are inherited things, things to be safeguarded and passed on. This attitude exercises itself at the local level in the voluntary associations and small institutions of civil society. It is the core component in that associational genius that Tocqueville discerned in the American people. It is the legacy of a political order that regards people, not rulers, as the source of authority and the fount of responsible decision-making.

Environmental movements on the Left seldom pause to consider the question of human motivation. It is so clear to them that something must be done that they leap to the conclusion that it must be done by state power and imposed by law. The problem with that approach is that it makes mistakes into permanent legacies and provides no incentive to ordinary citizens to do what they are told. Conservatives, on the whole, are more respectful of human nature and will recognize in the attitude of trusteeship a feeling to which we automatically tend, when given the freedom to exercise it.

The job of protecting the environment is one that citizens must undertake, and we will—just as soon as we see it to be ours. The problem is not the lack of state initiatives but the surfeit of them and the general attitude, enhanced by every treaty and every leftist publicity stunt, that state control, not individual freedom, will make us take our responsibilities seriously. ■

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## My Body, My Choice

Not all Americans who don't have health insurance need pity—or policy.

**By James L. Payne**

IF I LIVED IN MASSACHUSETTS, as of July 1, 2007, I would be violating the law. That's when the state will require everyone over 18 years old to have health insurance. I don't have health insurance, I don't want it, and I refuse to buy it even though I can afford it.

Evidently, the idea of forcing everyone to buy insurance has broad appeal. The Massachusetts House approved the law requiring insurance 154 to 2, and the Senate backed it unanimously. Princeton University professor Uwe Reinhardt enthused that in forcing people to buy health insurance, “Massachusetts is the first state in America to reach full adulthood,” and he urged the rest of the country to leave “adolescence.” The Heritage Foundation endorses the plan; its health policy researcher Edmund Haislmaier calls it “a testament to the power of

good ideas.” The popularity of the Massachusetts measure makes me fear that in a few years my refusal of insurance will be a crime everywhere in America.

It's understandable that policymakers are eager to eliminate the uninsured. For years they've been told that we are the flies in the ointment of healthcare policy. It is said we are either wrecking the healthcare system by using services we don't pay for, or we are deprived of needed medical care and therefore objects of pity and subsidy.

These points may apply to some uninsured, but not to all. Some of us belong in what might be called the “successfully uninsured” category. We are not freeloaders. We believe we have a moral obligation to pay for the medical care we receive, and we always pay for it. I put no burden on doctors, hospitals, or



taxpayers, and politicians are wrong to assume I am part of America's health-care problem.

Politicians are also wrong to assume that I am pitiable. Like many Americans, I have significant savings and can afford medical expenses out of pocket. (Census Bureau figures for 2000 show that over 18 million households had assets in excess of \$250,000.) Our savings make it possible for my wife and me to decline both private insurance and Medicaid. (We are 68.) Those without savings are in a different situation: they probably need insurance or subsidy or charitable help. My point is that if you can handle your own medical bills through savings and personal responsibility, this is a sound approach. Politicians should encourage this state of self-reliance, not make it a crime.

What makes being insurance-free so desirable? The first advantage is flexibility. Several years ago, my wife had a serious bout with cancer. The successful treatment involved surgery to remove the cancer and local radiation. After much study, she decided to refuse the more massive radiation treatment recommended by the doctor and pursued alternative therapies, including acupuncture, nutritional therapy, massage, and naturopathic medicine. Every decision was made in terms of what seemed best to treat this illness. We were not drawn into using inappropriate therapies because they were "free" nor did we pass up desirable therapies because they were not covered.

The second advantage of being insurance-free is that we avoid bureaucracy. We don't fill out forms, we don't make phone calls trying to find out what's covered, and we don't play games (with the collusion of doctors) trying to get things we need paid for by someone else. If an aching back necessitates a different mattress, we go out and buy one and don't waste time and money trying to

prove to some clerk that it's covered. When the government offered a new piñata of benefits in the form of prescription-drug coverage, we escaped the frustration of figuring out how to deal with its staggering confusion. While other seniors were closeted with lawyers and sons-in-law trying to decide what to sign up for, we went hiking.

But what will happen if I face a medical problem that requires more than my savings? Consider a parallel question about some other commodity, say housing. I announce that I believe in paying for housing from my own financial resources. Someone asks, what happens if there is a house I want that costs more than I can afford? The obvious answer is that I don't buy it. I limit my housing consumption according to my resources.

That's the same answer I give about medical care: if something costs too much, I do without. This position, so obvious and sensible in other areas, is considered untenable when it comes to medical care. In this realm, the prevailing assumption is that everyone is entitled to all the health services he needs or wants.

It's one thing to announce this entitlement as an ideal but quite another to make it work. In the real world, medical resources are limited, and therefore all approaches to healthcare funding employ rationing.

In tax-based systems, administrators establish waiting lists so that some patients die before their opportunity for treatment comes up. They ban the use of expensive treatments and alternative therapies. And without exactly saying so, they underfund medical facilities so that patients wait in the halls of emergency wards, for example. In commercial insurance plans, rationing is implemented by restricting coverage to specific procedures and specific doctors and by setting upper limits to coverage.

Paying your own medical bills is simply another way of limiting con-

sumption: if a treatment costs too much, you don't buy it. The advantage of self-rationing is that it is frank and open and thus avoids the whining and blaming that characterize bureaucratic systems.

Covering your own treatment also lets you see that there are more socially constructive ways to use funds than spending on healthcare. Suppose that fixing your limping gait requires complicated care, costing hundreds of thousands of dollars. If others pay for this care through a government insurance program, you might agree to accept it. But suppose you are paying for it with your own savings. Now you might think twice about spending the money on yourself. You might know of a school for autistic children that could put the money to good use. Or you might have a grandchild who needs the money to start a business.

Such decisions are indeed difficult, but we need to face them if we are to make sensible choices about healthcare. Today we are not facing them. We are hiding behind the confusion of a tangled government/corporate system that pretends we can have all the medical care we want.

Spending my own money on healthcare helps me set a rational limit to medical spending, even on spending to preserve my life. Not buying health insurance and not allowing politicians to force others to fund my needs helps me keep my consumption of medical resources within fitting bounds.

This way of looking at health insurance may be old-fashioned, and it may not address all the gaps in healthcare systems, but should it be a crime? ■

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# The Bosnian Connection

The civil war that inspired both liberal hawks and Islamist jihadis

By Brendan O'Neill

IN A RECENT *Vanity Fair* feature, Christopher Hitchens bemoaned the transformation of London into “Londonistan.” He wrote about Finsbury Park, a shabby, multicultural corner of the capital, where the old sights of Irish immigrants staggering from dingy pubs and Greeks trying to hawk kebabs have been replaced by young Muslim men sporting beards and women cloaked in the black *hijab*.

Then there is the notorious Finsbury Park mosque. Abu Hamza al-Masri, the hook-handed, one-eyed former Mujahideen of the Afghan-Soviet War, was the *imam* there until his arrest and imprisonment in 2006 for soliciting murder and inciting racial hatred. The 7/7 bombers were inspired by Hamza’s rancid rhetoric. Other visitors to the mosque included Richard Reid, the failed shoe-bomber, and Zacarias Moussaoui, the French-Moroccan found guilty of being the “20th hijacker” of 9/11.

For Hitchens, the transformation of this once lively mixed suburb into a hotbed of Islamic radicalism, where the “the scent of Algeria ... now predominates along the main thoroughfare,” is symptomatic of a broader shift in British society. “How did a nation move from cricket and fish-and-chips to burkas and shoe-bombers in a single generation?” he asks.

Hitchens also revisits the curious case of Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheikh. As British as they come, he was brought up in a leafy suburb in northeast London, where he was privately educated, and later attended the London School of

Economics. Now he is in prison in Pakistan for orchestrating the beheading of American journalist Daniel Pearl. According to Hitchens, Sheikh’s shocking journey, from burying his head in books at the LSE in the early 1990s to crudely removing the head of an American writer in Pakistan in 2002, shows the lethality of the radical Islamist bug sweeping the British Isles.

Yet Hitchens omits one important fact about Sheikh. You see, Hitchens and Sheikh—the celebrated journalist and the imprisoned murderer—share a striking feature. Both were radicalized by the same issue: the civil war in Bosnia of 1992-95, and both were set on their current political trajectories by their deep sympathy for the Bosnian Muslims and their loathing of the Bosnian Serbs. Indeed, while they may have ended up worlds apart, with Hitchens writing pro-interventionist articles for the American press and Sheikh a crazed killer in Pakistan, one might argue that, politically, they are cut from the same cloth.

Sheikh was radicalized not by some ranting cleric with a chip on his shoulder but by a film made by a mainstream British charity about the suffering of Bosnian Muslims. After seeing the film during the student-organized “Bosnia Week” at the LSE in 1992, he decided to make his way to Bosnia and fight with the Arab Mujahideen who had traveled from far and wide to take up arms alongside the Bosnian Muslim Army. It was in Bosnia that Sheikh fell in with Kashmiri militants, later following them to Pakistan-ruled Kashmir and into a

life of terrorism that culminated in Pearl’s murder.

Hitchens experienced his conversion at the same time. Where the 1992 images of Bosnian Muslim suffering transformed Sheikh into a Mujahideen, they turned Hitchens—who until then had been a leftist opposed to Western military intervention—toward neoconservatism. As Hitchens said in an interview in 2004, “I first became interested in the neocons during the war in Bosnia. That war in the early 1990s changed a lot for me. That’s when I began to first find myself on the same side as the neocons.”

In 1992, as Sheikh was preparing to leave for Bosnia and take up arms against the Bosnian Serbs, Hitchens began agitating for American action against them. One went to fight alongside the Bosnian Muslim Army, the other called for the arming of the Bosnian Muslim Army and the military punishment of its opponents in the Bosnian Serb camp. The explosion of civil war in Bosnia in 1992 turned both into military interventionists who decided to declare war against what they considered “evil.”

Hitchens’s and Sheikh’s shared starting point is not a one-off. Many of today’s liberal hawks, who call for war against al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere, were on the side of the militants during the Bosnian conflict. Indeed, back then the pro-interventionist Left and al-Qaeda were allies. Both groups backed the Bosnian Muslim Army and demonized the Bosnian Serbs as savages. Liberal hawks, including Hitchens, did it with propaganda; al-Qaeda did it by

deed. But both the black-and-white worldviews of the Left neocons and the bin Ladenites were forged in the fires of the Bosnian war.

It is widely known that the Mujahideen first emerged during the Afghan-Soviet War of the 1980s, when they were armed and trained by American, British, Pakistani, and Saudi intelligence. Less well reported is the fact that Western forces later facilitated the movement of Mujahideen into Bosnia. Some 3,000 Islamic militants descended to fight alongside the Bosnian Muslims. The Clinton administration, which encouraged the arming of the Bosnian Muslim Army by Iran, Saudi Arabia, and various dubious Islamic charities, helped to open a gateway.

The similarities between the positions of the newly emerging liberal hawks and the line taken by al-Qaeda militants were striking. Both insisted that this dirty civil war was a defining battle. As the British author Philip Hammond argues, hawkish journalists in the liberal Western press depicted the war as “a simple tale of good versus evil.” Likewise, in his book *Al-Qaeda’s Jihad in Europe: The Afghan-Bosnian Network*, Evan Kohlmann describes how Mujahideen who fought in Bosnia believed there was a “clear divergence between good and evil” and understood the conflict “in terms of an apocalyptic, one-dimensional religious confrontation between Muslims and non-Muslims.”

Many Western writers and thinkers cheered the Bosnian Muslim Army (BiH), and the U.S. surreptitiously armed and trained it in 1994 and 1995. At the same time, Mujahideen formed a Battalion of Holy Warriors used as a vanguard in assaults on Bosnian Serb positions. According to a UN communiqué of 1995, the battalion was “directly dependent on BiH staff for supplies” and for “directions” during combat with the Serbs. In short, Western hawks and the

“military humanitarians” of the Clinton administration were abetting a military outfit that had numerous Mujahideen members right through to 1995.

Many of the Mujahideen who fought in Bosnia would relate that they were inspired to do so by the saber-rattling reports of Western journalists. Some may even have been moved to Holy War by Hitchens. In Kohlmann’s book, Mujahideen reveal that they ventured to Bosnia because they read newspaper coverage of the “genocide” and the “camps used by Serb soldiers systematically to rape thousands of Muslim women.” Noam Chomsky has said there was a “religious fervor” about Bosnia in Western media and political circles in the early ’90s, with both political leaders and journalists demonizing the Serbs as uniquely wicked. The Mujahideen can be seen as a physical manifestation of this fervor and were, for all intents and purposes, the shock troops of the Western liberal prejudice of the age.

How did two polar opposite forces—Western liberals and Eastern Holy Warriors—come to be on the same side in the Balkans 15 years ago? I believe that both camps adopted Bosnia as a special cause in response to their own crises of direction and legitimacy. In his book *Divided Europe*, Adam Burgess explains why the liberal Left was so fervent about punishing the Serbs: “Deprived of the traditional staples of left-wing politics [after the Cold War], the search for an alternative became increasingly pronounced in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The left embraced new causes. It is in this context that sense can be made of the readiness of the left to embrace the anti-Serbian ‘cause’ with less restraint and qualification than even the rest of society.”

The Mujahideen also embraced the anti-Serbian cause because they had lost direction. In the early ’90s, Afghanistan

was becoming bogged down in civil war after the withdrawal of the Soviets, and governments in the Middle East and North Africa were persecuting veteran Mujahideen as they returned from the Afghan theater. Bosnia was a godsend (or perhaps an “Allah-send”) for the Mujahideen. The civil war occurred at a “propitious” time for the “stranded foreign fighters,” writes Kohlmann. For both Western leftists and the Mujahideen, Bosnia became a refuge from their harsh realities—a place where they could fight fantasy battles against evil to make themselves feel purposeful and heroic, rather than having to face up to the problems in their movements.

The Bosnia experience had a transformative effect on both. It made some on the Left pro-interventionist, and it turned some Mujahideen from religious nationalists, as they had been in Afghanistan, into self-described cross-border warriors against evil. It is striking how many al-Qaeda attacks were facilitated or carried out by veterans of the Bosnian *jihad*. Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, architect of the 9/11 attacks, fought in Bosnia, as did two of the hijackers. One of the main suspects in the Madrid train bombings trained in Bosnia. (He, too, was inspired to go there by Western media coverage.) The foiled “millennium plot” to blow up the Los Angeles airport in 2000 was overseen by individuals with connections to Bosnia, as were the 1998 African embassy bombings.

Liberal hawks and al-Qaeda have no moral equivalence whatsoever. The hawks are merely misguided whereas al-Qaeda is murderous. Yet both camps view world affairs in simple terms in which everything is reducible to a clash between good and evil. Maybe that is because both were forged during that most moralized of wars—Bosnia. ■

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# Are Gazans Now Our Enemies, Too?

In his Second Inaugural, George W. Bush proclaimed the goal he hoped would be his legacy: "It is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of

democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world."

Bush then called for free elections in Palestine, open to all parties. So it came to pass that in February 2006, Hamas triumphed over Fatah.

Instantly, Israel cut off all tax revenue to the Palestinian Authority and demanded Bush halt aid. Meekly, Bush complied, destroying any remnants of his credibility. It was said that these Americans support free elections—as long as their side wins. The Palestinians were punished by the United States for having voted wrong.

Yet, in power, Hamas had a stake in peace: legitimacy, the aid from Europe and America, and its new role as the authentic voice of the Palestinian people.

The right course for Bush was clear. Be consistent. Recognize the election. Tell Hamas that U.S. aid would continue until Hamas broke its truce and suicide attacks began. We had an opportunity to separate the political wing of Hamas from the war wing. Bush would not even test it.

What, one wonders, did Bush think would happen if we bankrupted the new government? To whom did he expect Hamas to turn? By picking up our chips and walking away from the table, we ceded the pot to Iran.

To Likudniks and neocons, Hamas, Hezbollah, al-Qaeda, Syria, and Iran are one and the same—enemies hell-bent on the destruction of Israel and America, whom we must destroy before they destroy us. But to fail to differentiate among adversaries is to unite them and

ensure a war no one but the warmongers over here and over there wants.

Al-Qaeda is indeed our enemy. But Hamas has never targeted Americans. Hezbollah has not targeted Americans since Reagan ended our intervention in Lebanon's civil war and pulled the Marines out.

Syria's Bashir Assad is an Eagle Scout compared to his father, Hafez, the butcher of Homa, whom Bush's father made an ally in the Gulf War and to whom Ehud Barak was willing to give back the Golan Heights.

As for Iran, in two elections, 70 percent of the people voted anti-mullah. Ahmadinejad has been heckled and hooted at university speeches.

While Hamas, Hezbollah, Syria, and Iran have all been credibly charged with terrorism, Khadafi perpetrated the Pan Am 103 massacre. Yet Bush let him out of the penalty box when he renounced terror and atomic weapons and paid reparations to the families of his victims. What has Hamas done to us to compare with Lockerbie?

Israel demands that, until Hamas recognizes Israel's right to exist, accepts all past agreements, and renounces violence, the United States not speak to Hamas. But this is a preposterous demand on the world's first power and professed "honest broker" of Middle East peace.

Kennedy did not demand that Khrushchev rescind his "We will bury you!" pronouncement before the Vienna summit. Nixon did not demand Mao renounce violence in advancing Communist revolution before going to

Peking. The Bush-Olmert approach to diplomacy may be summed up: unless you people accept our demands, we do not talk to you.

Now that Hamas has eliminated Fatah from Gaza, Bush and Olmert have embraced Mahmoud Abbas and have begun to lavish upon him the aid denied Hamas when it won the election, on the condition that he not send aid to Gaza. This will make him a quisling. Gaza, "Hamastan" to the hawks, is to be cut off from diplomatic contact and denied all but humanitarian aid.

"Gaza," says Charles Krauthammer, "is now run ... by a movement that is revolutionary, Islamist and terrorist. Worse, Hamas is a client of Iran. Gaza now constitutes the farthest reach of the archipelago of Iranian proxies: Hamas in Palestine, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Mahdi Army (among others) in Iraq and the Alawite regime of Syria."

His advice to Israel: the next rocket should "be answered with a cut off of gasoline shipments. This should bring road traffic in Gaza to a halt within days. ... If that fails to concentrate the mind, the next step should be to cut off electricity."

Such policies as Krauthammer recommends—waging war on the women and the weak to force their menfolk to capitulate—have made Israel hated all over the Middle East.

The Bush record—launching an unprovoked war on Iraq, demanding free elections then refusing to talk to the winners, backing a five-week blitz of Lebanon for a Hezbollah raid that Beirut condemned, now consigning 1.4 million Palestinians in Gaza to isolation and destitution—has helped make him the most despised man in the region and lost his country all the good will piled up over generations. Quite a legacy. ■

# Six Days—and 40 Years

In 1967, Israel won Jerusalem, defeated its enemies, and expanded its borders. It has not recovered since.

By Leon Hadar

“IT WAS ISRAEL’S LAST WAR, and that means that you guys won’t have to fight in another war with the Arabs.” Mr. Arbel, our geography teacher sounded euphoric. He had just returned from the Sinai after doing his duty as a medic in what came to be known as the Six-Day War. He told the students who were about to enter their senior year at the Herzliya Hebrew High School (Gymnasium) in Tel Aviv that the military victory over the neighboring states of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan in June 1967 ensured that Israelis would soon be arriving at the promised land of eternal peace. Israel would return the Sinai to Egypt and the Golan Heights to Syria in exchange for peace agreements with these countries, would help resolve the “refugee problem,” and would co-exist in harmony with the “inhabitants” of the “territories.” (The term “Palestinians” had yet to be integrated into the public discourse.)

When the boys and girls in our class joined the Israel Defense Forces in 1969, we would probably spend our scheduled two-and-half years of compulsory military service playing soccer, beach bumming, partying, and preparing ourselves for college. Perhaps military service could be cut down to two years, and we could escape from our provincial setting and do some traveling abroad. London’s Abbey Road and the hippie hangouts of Amsterdam were popular destinations for Israeli kids hoping to discover what the Summer of Love was

all about. Indeed, Beatlemania was challenging Jerusalemania. “Jerusalem of Gold,” a song that celebrated the return to the Old City and the reunification of Western (Israeli) and Eastern (Palestinian) parts of Jerusalem was playing on the radio in the days after the occupation of the West Bank—or “the liberation of Judea and Samaria,” as many Israelis were starting to describe it. The Beatles’ *Sgt. Pepper’s Lonely Hearts Club Band* was released on June 1, four days before the war started, and my friends and I were hoping to listen to “Lucy in the Sky of Diamonds” on Radio Luxembourg, which was broadcasting throughout the Middle East.

As students at the Herzliya Gymnasium, which was established in 1905 in Jaffa and moved in 1909 to the first Hebrew city of Tel Aviv—it was named in honor of Theodor Herzl, the Zionist movement’s founder—we took pride in the fact that our alumni included prime ministers and generals and paid tribute each year to graduates of the school, including many officers in elite combat units who had been killed during Israel’s wars and whose names were listed on a memorial wall in the school. In 1964, the year in which I entered Herzliya, the school had highlighted its contribution to Israel’s security by merging with the most prestigious boarding school for future military officers.

In a way, Mr. Arbel was promising us that our names wouldn’t be added to the school’s memorial wall. But that was

only the subtext of his message, which suggested that we would be the first generation of Israelis to live in a postwar age of “normalcy.” We would no longer be segregated in a small and militarized Jewish ghetto and suffocated by pressures from a collectivist Zionist ideology that treated with disdain the pursuit of individual paths to happiness represented by westernized Tel Aviv and the Mediterranean coast of Israel, where a new form of secular Israeli-Hebrew identity had started to evolve.

Young Israelis frequenting cafés and boutiques in the city’s fashionable Dizengoff Street were denounced by Israel’s first prime minister, David Ben-Gurion, as the “Espresso Generation.” His government, like those of Pakistan and South Africa, barred the Beatles from performing in Israel. And the new generation was slammed by old-guard Zionist ideologues for their materialism and careerism, not to mention their hedonism and decadence, symbolized by the first discotheque and the first Chinese restaurant, which were opened in Tel Aviv in the mid 1960s. (Their owner was Mandy Rice-Davies, who had played a role in the British sex and political scandal known as the Profumo Affair before converting to Judaism and marrying an Israeli playboy.)

With peace supposedly around the corner of Dizengoff, the hope among my classmates was that ushering a post-ideological spirit into Israel would unleash a new era of political, economic, and

cultural freedom. As the saying went, Israelis would be able to “catch America,” that is, to live like Americans.

But Mr. Arbel was wrong. When the graduates of Herzliya’s Class of 1969 joined the IDF, in the midst of the “war of attrition” with Egypt, compulsory military services was extended to three years. Then came the bloody 1973 Yom Kippur War, and we ended up contributing more names than any other class in the school’s history to the list on its memorial wall. It grew even longer as the two Palestinian Intifadahs and other regional conflicts crushed post-1967 hopes of Israeli normalization in the Middle East. They revived during the swinging days of globalization, when Israelis and Palestinians were expected to surf the Internet happily ever after, then shattered once again in the aftermath of the collapse of the Oslo Peace Process. By then, I had decided to “catch America” in New York City and then Washington, D.C., joining the long list of members of Herzliya’s Alumni Association of North America.

Tel Aviv, persuaded of a political philosophy that stressed the need to make Israel a “normal” state and rightful member the community of nations, continued to assert itself as Israelis and Palestinians took the first steps toward reconciliation in the 1990s. But those who had hoped to “catch America” in Israel by introducing a constitution, changing the relations between synagogue and state, integrating Arab citizens into Israeli life, and most importantly, creating the foundations for an independent Palestinian state that would live in peace with Israel—the necessary condition for Israeli integration into the Middle East—found themselves on the defensive, confronted by the powerful political force that emerged in the aftermath of the Six-Day War.

For most of the 1960s and ’70s, one of Tel Aviv’s most colorful figures, pilot and

restaurant owner Abie Nathan, operated a seagoing “pirate” radio station, the Voice of Peace, which broadcast, in English, Hebrew, and Arabic, a mix of the latest rock music interspersed with calls for peace. (Nathan even flew in his private plane to Egypt twice, hoping to get a private audience with President Gamal Abdel Nasser.) The station, whose broadcasts opened each day with John Lennon’s “Give Peace a Chance,” was popular among young Israeli professionals and students who constituted the backbone of the Israeli peace camp. Its members supported giving up the occupied territories in exchange for peace. But in the hit-parade of Israel’s political ideologies, “Jerusalem of Gold”—with its lyrics, “We have returned to the water wells, the markets and the square / a shofar calls at the Temple Mount in the Old City”—overpowered “Give Peace a Chance.”

THEIR VISION WAS THAT OF AN **ISOLATIONIST, UNILATERALIST, AND ANGRY JEWISH STATE** IN A NEVERENDING CONFRONTATION WITH THE PALESTINIANS, THE ARAB WORLD, THE MUSLIMS, AND THE **GENTILES**.

Indeed, the coalition of Greater Israel, symbolized by Jerusalem and the Jewish settlements that started to crop up in the West Bank after the Six-Day War, represented the new spirit of radical Zionism, led by right-wing nationalist parties that had been marginalized politically until 1967, Jewish settlers, and ultra-Orthodox militants. Their vision was that of an isolationist, unilateralist, and angry Jewish state in a never-ending confrontation with the Palestinians, the Arab World, the Muslims, and the Gentiles. They expected Jews in America and elsewhere to immigrate—to make *Aliya*, that is, to ascend—to Israel, or at the minimum, provide it with political and financial support. This

messianic and apocalyptic outlook was echoed in the popular Israeli slogan, “The whole world is against us,” which clashed with the dreams of Tel Aviv.

One of the central and certainly the most tragic figure in the post-1967 saga was the late Israeli military and political leader Yitzhak Rabin. A proud member of Israel’s secular and Westernized Zionist elite, Rabin was born in Palestine (a “Sabra”) to a family of Eastern European Zionist pioneers, fought in Israel’s War of Independence and the 1956 Sinai Campaign, and was groomed by the country’s founding fathers to lead the new nation-state.

As the IDF’s chief of staff in the weeks leading up to the Six-Day War, it was Rabin’s retaliatory military strikes against Jordan and his threats to punish Syria for its alleged support of anti-Israeli terrorists that helped ignite the military tensions with Damascus that in

turn set in motion the Middle East crisis that resulted in the third Arab-Israeli war. Syria’s ally, the Soviet Union, pressed Egypt’s Nasser to deploy troops in the Sinai as a way of deterring Israel. Egypt closed the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping and formed a military alliance with Jordan and Syria. Diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis failed, and Israel launched a preemptive strike against Egypt, Jordan, and Syria.

Rabin’s conduct before, during, and after the war personified Israel’s mental state. His somewhat hysterical response to Syrian policies was followed by a nervous breakdown, which he suffered after Nasser moved his forces into Sinai



and the young Israeli general became convinced that the Jewish state was facing another Holocaust. In reality, Israel's powerful military machine, which the French helped to build, destroyed the air forces of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria and in six days occupied the Sinai, the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and the Golan Heights. On one day, Rabin's psyche was consumed by the hellish specter of Auschwitz; on the next, he was daydreaming about re-establishing the ancient glory of the Kingdom of Israel.

A few weeks after the war ended, and as Israel was taking steps to consolidate its control over Jerusalem—"the city that joined as one"—Rabin accepted an honorary degree, bestowed on him by the Hebrew University. As the chief of staff stood on Mount Scopus, "in this ancient and splendid site that looks over our eternal capital," he celebrated Israel's military victory. The conquest of the Old City of Jerusalem, Rabin said, had stirred Israelis to "wells of emotions and spiritual elevation." He also reiterated Israel's commitment to "values of moral goodness, values of human goodness," and to seeking peace with the Arabs.

Like most Israelis, Rabin, who later served as ambassador to Washington and as prime minister, would be torn between the nationalist and religious fervor, stirred up by prewar fear and postwar arrogance, and the continuing search for acceptance by the world, for a sense of normalcy. But the struggle between the two value systems, Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, and the political forces that attended each, was never really resolved, as power shifted back and forth between those favoring accommodation with the Palestinians and those fantasizing about Greater Israel.

Rabin's election as Israel's prime minister in 1992 represented a clear victory for the peace camp. He led the process

of Israeli-Palestinian reconciliation that brought about the Oslo Accords and the peace agreement with Jordan. When he shook hands with Palestine Liberation Organization leader Yasser Arafat and Jordan's King Hussein on the lawn of the White House, Rabin enjoyed the support of young Israelis hoping to transform their country into a modern center of high-tech and business success—the Singapore of the Middle East.

Thus on Nov. 28, 1993, following the signing of the Oslo Accords, Abie Nathan decided to sink his peace ship in international waters. The agreement validated the Voice of Peace's mission, and on the final day of broadcasting, Abie instructed the presenters to play non-stop Beatles records.

Sitting on the White House lawn and watching Rabin shake hands with Arafat, it seemed to me as though the Six-Day War was finally ending. I imagined that at this moment a teacher was promising the members of Herzliya's Class of 1993 that his students wouldn't have to fight another war with the Arabs.

While the first Intifadah demonstrated to Rabin and other members of Israel's elite the costs involved in continuing to maintain control over the territories he helped "liberate" in 1967, the demographic reality, in which the Arab Palestinians with their higher birth rate could outnumber Jews in Greater Israel by the first decade of the 21st century, suggested to them that Israel would have to make a choice between remaining a democratic state with a Jewish majority and becoming a binational state. At the same time, Republican and Democratic administrations in Washington provided Rabin and his political allies with incentives to withdraw to the pre-1967 borders as a way of securing Israel's future.

"We tended to believe that the whole world is against us, that we have to live alone in a new ghetto of ours," Rabin

said after accepting an honorary degree from Bar-Ilan University five months before the Oslo Accords were signed. But now it was "an entirely different world, and I believe that our generation, the generation that experienced the two most important events, has to change," he stressed. "No more fear, feelings that the whole world is against us, that we are besieged." He called on Israelis to adopt a different attitude of openness and strength.

But two years later, as he was leaving a mass rally at the center of Tel Aviv in support of the Oslo process, Rabin was assassinated by Yigal Amir, a right-wing Orthodox Jewish extremist living in a settlement in the West Bank. Amir and the Greater Israel camp had won. The Oslo process came gradually to an end; the Palestinian-Israeli talks collapsed in 2000; the second Intifadah began; and in the post-9/11 mindset, the Israeli and American narratives that combined victimology with arrogance seemed to merge.

"The whole world is against us" mentality resonated among the neoconservative ideologues who hijacked U.S. foreign policy in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks. It has since been transformed into the favored jingle of that alliance of messianic Zionists and American imperialists hoping that U.S. hegemony in the Middle East will help secure Greater Israel. As a result, the United States may end up reliving Israel's post-1967 experience of a military victory turning into a political disaster.

But at least America will leave Iraq one day. Israelis will probably be stuck in the territories "liberated" in 1967 for many years to come, where the dream of a normal state could be buried forever. ■

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# Genocide or Civil War?

In Darfur, interventionists have won the name game.

**By Mahmood Mamdani**

THE SIMILARITIES between Iraq and Darfur are remarkable. The estimate of the number of civilians killed over the past three years is similar. The killers are mostly paramilitaries, closely linked to the official military, which is said to be their main source of arms. The victims, too, are by and large identified as members of groups rather than targeted as individuals. But the violence is named differently. In Iraq, it is a cycle of insurgency and counter-insurgency; in Darfur, it is genocide. Why the difference? Who does the naming? What difference does it make?

One would expect that Americans would feel responsible for the violence in Iraq. But Iraq is a messy place in the American imagination, a place with messy politics. Americans worry about what their government should do in Iraq. Should it withdraw? What would happen if it did? In contrast, there is nothing messy about Darfur. It is a place without history and without politics: simply a site where perpetrators clearly identifiable as Arabs confront victims clearly identifiable as Africans.

A full-page advertisement has appeared several times a week in the *New York Times* calling for intervention in Darfur now. It urges the intervening forces to be placed under “a chain of command allowing necessary and timely military action without approval from distant political or civilian personnel.” That intervention in Darfur should not be subject to “political or civilian” considerations and that the intervening forces should have the right to shoot—to kill—without permission from distant

places: these are said to be “humanitarian” demands. In the same vein, a New Republic editorial on Darfur has called for “force as a first-resort response.” What makes the situation even more puzzling is that some of those who are calling for an end to intervention in Iraq are demanding an intervention in Darfur.

What would happen if we thought of Darfur as we do of Iraq, as a place with a history and politics—a messy politics of insurgency and counter-insurgency? Why should an intervention in Darfur not turn out to be a trigger that escalates rather than reduces the level of violence as intervention in Iraq has? Morally, there is no doubt about the horrific nature of the violence against civilians in Darfur. The ambiguity lies in the politics of the violence, whose sources include both a state-connected counter-insurgency and an organized insurgency, very much like the violence in Iraq.

The insurgency and counter-insurgency in Darfur began in 2003. Both were driven by an intermeshing of domestic tensions in the context of a peace-averse international environment defined by the war on terror. On the one hand, there was a struggle for power within the political class, with more marginal interests calling for reform at the center. On the other, there was a community-level split between nomads and settled farmers, who had earlier forged a way of sharing semi-arid land in the dry season. With the drought of the late 1970s, co-operation turned into intense struggle.

As the insurgency took root among the prospering peasant tribes, the government trained and armed the poorer

nomads and formed a militia—the Janjawid—that became the vanguard of the unfolding counter-insurgency. The worst violence came from the Janjawid, but the insurgent movements were also accused of gross violations. Anyone wanting to end the spiraling violence would have to bring about power-sharing at the state level and resource-sharing at the community level.

Two official verdicts have been delivered on the violence, the first from the U.S., the second from the UN. The American verdict was unambiguous: Darfur was the site of an ongoing genocide. The UN Commission on Darfur was created in the aftermath of the American verdict and in response to American pressure. It was more ambiguous. In September 2004, Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, then the chair of the African Union, visited UN headquarters and was asked to pronounce on the violence in Darfur: was it genocide or not? His response was clear:

Before you can say that this is genocide or ethnic cleansing, we will have to have a definite decision and plan and program of a government to wipe out a particular group of people, then we will be talking about genocide, ethnic cleansing. What we know is not that. What we know is that there was an uprising, rebellion, and the government armed another group of people to stop that rebellion. That's what we know. That does not amount to genocide from our own reckoning. It amounts to of course conflict. It amounts to violence.

By October, the Security Council had established a commission of inquiry on Darfur and asked it to report within three months. The commission concluded that “the Government of the Sudan has not pursued a policy of genocide ... directly or through the militias under its control.” But it did find that the government’s violence was “deliberately and indiscriminately directed against civilians.” Indeed, “even where rebels may have been present in villages, the impact of attacks on civilians shows that the use of military force was manifestly disproportionate to any threat posed by the rebels.” These acts, the commission concluded, “were conducted on a widespread and systematic basis, and therefore may amount to crimes against humanity.” Yet, the commission insisted, they did not amount to genocide: “The crucial element of genocidal intent appears to be missing ... it would seem that those who planned and organized attacks on villages pursued the intent to drive the victims from their homes, primarily for purposes of counter-insurgency warfare.”

At the same time, the commission assigned secondary responsibility to rebel forces that it held “responsible for serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law which may amount to war crimes.” If the government stood accused of “crimes against humanity,” rebel movements were accused of “war crimes.” Finally, the commission identified individual perpetrators and presented the UN secretary general with a sealed list that included “officials of the government of Sudan, members of militia forces, members of rebel groups and certain foreign army officers acting in their personal capacity.”

The commission’s findings highlighted three violations of international law: disproportionate response, conducted on a widespread and systematic basis, targeting entire groups but with-

out the intention to eliminate them as groups. It is for this last reason that the commission ruled out the finding of genocide. Its less grave findings of “crimes against humanity” and “war crimes” are not unique to Darfur, but also fit the U.S. occupation of Iraq, the Hema-Lendu violence in eastern Congo, and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon.

The journalist in the U.S. most closely identified with consciousness-raising on Darfur is *New York Times* columnist Nicholas Kristof. To peruse Kristof’s Darfur columns over the past three years is to see the reduction of a complex political context to a morality tale unfolding in a world populated by villains and victims who never trade places and so can always and easily be told apart. It is a world where atrocities mount geometrically, the perpetrators so evil and the victims so helpless that the only possibility of relief is a rescue mission from the outside.

Kristof made six trips to Darfur and began by writing of it as a case of “ethnic cleansing”: “Sudan’s Arab rulers” had “forced 700,000 black African Sudanese to flee their villages” (March 24, 2004). Three days later, he upped the ante: “the government of Sudan is engaged in genocide against three large African tribes in its Darfur region.” He continued, “The killings are being orchestrated by the Arab-dominated Sudanese government” and “the victims are non-Arabs: blacks in the Zaghawa, Massalliet and Fur tribes.” He estimated the death toll at a thousand a week. Two months later, on May 29, he revised the estimates dramatically upwards, citing predictions from the U.S. Agency for International Development to the effect that “at best ... 100,000 people will die in Darfur this year of malnutrition and disease,” but “if things go badly, half a million will die.”

The UN commission’s report confirmed “massive displacement”—“more

than a million” internally displaced and “more than 200,000” refugees in Chad—and the destruction of “several hundred” villages and hamlets as “irrefutable facts.” But it gave no confirmed numbers for those killed. Instead, it noted rebel claims that government-allied forces had “allegedly killed over 70,000 persons.” Following the publication of the report, Kristof began to scale down his estimates. On Feb. 23, 2005, he admitted, “the numbers are fuzzy.” He went on to give a range of figures, from a low of 70,000, which he dismissed as “a UN estimate,” to “independent estimates [that] exceed 220,000.” A warning followed: “the number is rising by about ten thousand a month.”

The publication of the commission’s report had considerable effect. Internationally, it raised doubts about whether what was going on in Darfur could be termed genocide. Even U.S. officials were unwilling to go along with the high estimates propagated by the Save Darfur campaign. On May 3, Kristof noted with dismay that not only had “Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick pointedly refused to repeat the administration’s past judgment that the killings amount to genocide,” he had “also cited an absurdly low estimate of Darfur’s total death toll: 60,000 to 160,000.” As an alternative, Kristof cited the latest estimate of deaths from the Coalition for International Justice as “nearly 400,000, and rising by 500 a day.” In three months, Kristof’s estimates had gone up from 10,000 to 15,000 a month. Six months later, on Nov. 27, Kristof warned that “if aid groups pull out ... the death toll could then rise to 100,000 a month.”

In the Kristof columns, there is one area of deafening silence about the fact that what is happening in Darfur is a civil war. Hardly a word is said about the insurgency, about the civilian deaths insurgents mete out, about acts that the



commission characterized as “war crimes.”

Newspaper writing on Darfur has sketched a pornography of violence. It seems fascinated by and fixated on the gory details. The implication is that the motivation of the perpetrators lies in biology (“race”) and, if not that, certainly in “culture.” This voyeuristic approach accompanies a moralistic discourse whose effect is both to obscure the politics of the violence and position the reader as a virtuous, not just a concerned, observer.

#### THIS ATTEMPT TO FIND AN **AFRICAN REPLAY OF THE HOLOCAUST** NOT ONLY DOES NOT WORK BUT ALSO HAS **PERVERSE CONSEQUENCES**.

Journalism gives us a simple moral world, where a group of perpetrators face a group of victims, but where neither history nor motivation is thinkable. It looks for an uncomplicated moral that describes the victim as untainted and the perpetrator as evil. Where yesterday’s victims are today’s perpetrators, where victims have turned perpetrators, this attempt to find an African replay of the Holocaust not only does not work but also has perverse consequences.

The conflict in Darfur is highly politicized, and so is the international campaign. One of the campaign’s constant refrains has been that the ongoing genocide is racial: Arabs are trying to eliminate Africans. But both “Arab” and “African” have several meanings in Sudan. Locally, “Arab” is a pejorative reference to the lifestyle of the nomad as uncouth; regionally, it refers to someone whose primary language is Arabic. In this sense, a group could become “Arab” over time. The third meaning of “Arab” is privileged and exclusive; it is the claim of the riverine political aristocracy who ruled Sudan since independence and equated Arabization with the spread of

civilization and being Arab with descent.

“African” was a subaltern identity that also had the potential of being either exclusive or inclusive. The two meanings were not only contradictory but came from the experience of two different insurgencies. The inclusive meaning was more political than racial or even cultural in the sense that an “African” was anyone determined to make a future within Africa. It was pioneered by John Garang, the leader of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army in the south, as a way of holding together the New

Sudan he hoped to see. In contrast, its exclusive meaning came in two versions, one hard (racial) and the other soft (linguistic)—“African” as Bantu and “African” as the identity of anyone who spoke a language indigenous to Africa. The Save Darfur campaign’s characterization of the violence as Arab against African obscured both the fact that the violence was not one-sided and the contest over the meaning of Arab and African was ultimately about who belonged and who did not in the political community called Sudan. The depoliticization, naturalization, and, ultimately, demonization of the notion “Arab,” as against “African,” has been the deadliest effect, whether intended or not, of the Save Darfur campaign.

Depoliticization gave campaigners three advantages. First, they were able to occupy the moral high ground. The campaign presented itself as apolitical but moral, its concern limited to saving lives. Second, only a single-issue campaign could bring together in a unified chorus forces that were otherwise adversaries: at one end, the Christian Right and the Zionist lobby, at the other,

a mainly university-based peace movement. Nat Hentoff of *The Village Voice* wrote of the Save Darfur Coalition as “an alliance of more than 515 faith-based, humanitarian and human rights organizations.” Surely, such a wide coalition would cease to hold together if the issue shifted to, say, Iraq.

To understand the third advantage, we have to return to the question of how many of those calling for an end to American intervention in Iraq are demanding an intervention in Darfur. It’s tempting to think that the advantage of Darfur lies in its being a small, faraway place where those who drive the war on terror do not have a vested interest. That this is hardly the case is evident if one compares the American response to Darfur with its non-response to Congo, even though the dimensions of that conflict give it a mega-Darfur quality: the numbers killed are estimated in the millions rather than the hundreds of thousands; the bulk of the killing is done by paramilitaries trained, organized, and armed by neighboring governments; and the victims on both sides are framed in collective rather than individual terms, to the point that one influential version defines both as racial identities and the conflict as a replay of the Rwandan genocide. Given all this, how does one explain that the focus of the most ambitious humanitarian movement in the U.S. is Darfur and not Kivu?

Kristof was asked this very question: “When I spoke at Cornell University recently, a woman asked why I always harp on Darfur. It’s a fair question. The number of people killed in Darfur so far is modest in global terms: estimates range from 200,000 to more than 500,000. In contrast, four million people have died since 1998 as a result of the fighting in Congo, the most lethal conflict since World War Two.” But instead of answering the question, Kristof moved on: “And malaria annually kills

one million to three million people—meaning that three years’ deaths in Darfur are within the margin of error of the annual global toll from malaria.” From there he went on to compare the deaths in Darfur to the deaths from malaria, rather than the conflict in Congo: “We have a moral compass within us, and its needle is moved not only by human suffering but also by human evil. That’s what makes genocide special—not just the number of deaths but the government policy behind them. And that in turn is why stopping genocide should be an even higher priority than saving lives from Aids or malaria.” That did not explain the relative silence on Congo. Could the reason be that in the case of Congo, Hema and Lendu militias were trained by America’s allies in the region, Rwanda and Uganda? Is that why the violence in Darfur—but not the violence in Kivu—is named as a genocide?

It seems that genocide has become a label to be stuck on your worst enemy, part of a rhetorical arsenal that helps vilify adversaries while ensuring impunity for allies. In Kristof’s words, the point is not so much “human suffering” as “human evil.” Unlike Kivu, Darfur can be neatly integrated into the war on terror, for it offers a valuable asset with which to demonize an enemy: a genocide perpetrated by Arabs.

If many of the leading lights in the Darfur campaign are fired by moral indignation, this derives from two events: the Nazi Holocaust and the Rwandan genocide. Darfur is today a metaphor for senseless violence in politics, as indeed Rwanda was a decade before. In *We wish to inform you that tomorrow we will be killed with our families*, the most widely read book on the genocide, Philip Gourevitch envisaged Rwanda as a replay of the Holocaust, with Hutu cast as perpetrators and Tutsi as victims. Again, the encounter

between the two seemed to take place outside any context, as part of an eternal encounter between evil and innocence. In December 2004, Kristof recalled the lessons of Rwanda: “Early in his presidency, Mr. Bush read a report about Bill Clinton’s paralysis during the Rwandan genocide and scrawled in the margin: ‘Not on my watch.’ But in fact the same thing is happening on his watch, and I find that heartbreaking and baffling.”

With very few exceptions, the Save Darfur campaign has drawn a single lesson from Rwanda: the problem was U.S. failure to intervene to stop the genocide. Rwanda is the guilt that America must expiate, so it must be ready to intervene, for good and against evil, even globally.

What the humanitarian intervention lobby fails to see is that the U.S. did intervene in Rwanda, through a proxy—the RPF, backed by entire units from the Uganda Army. The green light was given to the RPF, whose commanding officer, Paul Kagame, had recently returned from training in the U.S., just as it was lately given to the Ethiopian army in Somalia. Instead of using its resources and influence to bring about a political solution to the civil war, the U.S. signaled to one of the parties that it could pursue victory with impunity. This unilateralism was part of what led to the disaster, and that is the real lesson of Rwanda.

Applied to Darfur, it is sobering. Nurturing hopes of an external military intervention among those in the insurgency who aspire to victory and reinforcing the fears of those in the counter-insurgency who see it as a prelude to defeat are precisely the ways to ensure that it becomes a Rwanda. Strengthening those on both sides who stand for a political settlement to the civil war is the only realistic approach.

The dynamic of civil war in Sudan has fed on multiple sources: first, the post-independence monopoly of power

enjoyed by a tiny Arabized elite, which has bred growing resistance among the majority, marginalized populations in the south, east, and west of the country; second, the rebel movements that have bred ambitious leaders unwilling to enter into power-sharing arrangements as a prelude to peace; and, finally, external forces that continue to encourage those interested in retaining or obtaining a monopoly of power.

The camp of peace needs to come to a second realization: peace cannot be built through humanitarian intervention. The history of colonialism should teach us that every major intervention has been justified as a “civilizing mission.” Nor was it mere idiosyncrasy that inspired the devotion with which many colonial officers and archivists recorded the details of barbarity among the colonized—the practice of child marriage in India or slavery and female genital mutilation in Africa. I am not suggesting that this was all invention, but chronicling atrocities had a practical purpose: it provided the moral pretext for intervention. Now, as then, imperial interventions claim to have a dual purpose: to rescue minority victims of ongoing barbarities and quarantine majority perpetrators with the stated aim of civilizing them. Iraq should act as a warning on this score. The worst thing in Darfur would be an Iraq-style intervention. That would almost certainly spread the civil war to other parts of Sudan, unraveling the peace process in the east and south and dragging the whole country into the global war on terror. ■

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# Bush Against Himself

During his recent trip to Europe, President Bush spoke at a conference of political dissidents in Prague. Former Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar had organized

the event, inviting the “dissident President,” as Bush described himself in his speech, to talk about (what else?) freedom, democracy, and terrorism.

Aznar was a founding member of the extremely short-lived “coalition of the willing” and one of the main forces behind the invention of the entirely artificial “New Europe,” consisting of Britain, Spain, and a gaggle of Eastern European governments desperate for Washington’s approval. This was the New Europe that endorsed the Iraq War in open defiance of massive popular dissent against government policy. It was fitting that Aznar arranged the meeting, since the list of its more famous attendees seemed to be an international Who’s Who of European supporters of the invasion, including Gary Kasparov, Vaclav Havel, and Natan Sharansky.

Sharansky, a former Soviet dissident, is Bush’s spiritual father in the religion of global democratic revolution. His influence with the president is such that his personal intervention trumped the explicit opposition of the State Department to Bush’s participation in the conference. That is, the president heeded the call of ideology and ignored the dissent of career diplomats. While Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has begun tacking back toward something approaching foreign-policy realism as the last pillars of the “freedom agenda” come crashing down around her—one might describe it as the birth pangs of the old Middle East—Bush seems intent on blithely pressing ahead with his “ideological struggle.”

Though the perverting effects of rigid and revolutionary ideology were distorting U.S. policy and damaging American interests long before, this Marxist-Leninist phrase became a common element in the president’s vocabulary only after the start of his second term. Worse than his utopian promise of “ending tyranny in our world” was the disturbing historical determinism and rhetoric of inevitability in his wild-eyed, apocalyptic Second Inaugural Address, in which he declared, “There is only one force of history that can break the reign of hatred and resentment, and expose the pretensions of tyrants, and reward the hopes of the decent and tolerant, and that is the force of human freedom.”

Horrorifying in their guarantee for endless conflict and perpetual war, these sorts of statements were established features of Bush’s language well before that. Speaking in late 2003 at the National Endowment for Democracy, Bush had called liberty “the plan of Heaven for humanity,” a whiggish, quasi-religious historical determinism that finds scant support in the record of history and classical, Christian, and much modern conservative thought. More bluntly, he said: “We believe that liberty is the design of nature; we believe that liberty is the direction of history.”

It is all the more ironic, then, that Bush boldly affirmed in Prague: “The communists had an imperial ideology that claimed to know the directions of history. But in the end, it was overpowered by ordinary people who wanted to live their lives, and worship their God,

and speak the truth to their children.” This statement captured the triumphalist tone of the speech, which drove home yet again the talking point that *jihadi* terrorists are just like communists (except when they are just like Nazis). Yet there was something else in this statement that was as profound as the president was oblivious to its meaning.

What Bush and his speechwriters had evidently failed to notice was that his ridicule of an imperial ideology that claimed to know the direction of history also turned back and refuted every claim the president had made over the course of at least four years about the inevitable march of freedom and democracy—aided by the frequent use of state violence. As they had done before, he was unwittingly saying, ordinary people who want to live their lives will eventually defeat and overthrow this empire with its delusions of grandeur and global domination, just as others had done to the armed doctrines of the past. Unaware of the import of what he had said, as he so often seems to be, the president in one speech managed to demolish the absurd pretensions of his imperial ideology and his presumptuous claims to be on the side of vast, unstoppable historical forces.

Prophets of their own inevitable triumph have a strange way of bringing disaster on themselves and their people. The past is littered with the ruins of ideologies certain that History would bring them victory. In Prague, while declaring the certainty of freedom and democracy sweeping the globe, President Bush unknowingly admitted that all of his policies were doomed to fail and that history is most assuredly not on his side. ■

# Reagan Clone Wanted

Conservative convictions not required. Fred Thompson seems to fit.

By Michael Brendan Dougherty

WHO IS THE NEXT Ronald Reagan? That is the question the ten Republican presidential candidates tried to answer in their first debate, held (where else?) at the Reagan library. The Gipper's name came up 31 times in their 75-minute exchange. It is also the question reporters ask GOP activists for man-on-the-street color in their stories. More and more mention another avuncular actor, Fred Thompson, though he has yet to even enter the race.

In March, Chris Wallace opened a "Fox News Sunday" interview with the former Tennessee senator by asking, "Is Fred Thompson the next Ronald Reagan?" Britain's *Daily Telegraph* attempted to break news by claiming that former Reagan aides like Michael Deaver were lining up behind the "Law and Order" candidate, quoting the former deputy White House chief of staff saying of Thompson, "He is very popular in his party. He could change this whole thing and turn this primary system upside down." *Newsweek* found social conservatives like Richard Lamb licking their chops for a Thompson candidacy: "Fred Thompson is a Southern-fried Reagan. ... He has the same appeal," said the Southern Baptist Convention's president. Now self-described "Fred-Heads" are making the connection explicit: an unofficial Thompson website calls itself [www.anotherronaldreagan.com](http://www.anotherronaldreagan.com).

The longing for a new Great Communicator has become pronounced in recent years. Attendees of the Conservative Political Action Conference, when

asked whether they would be more likely to support a presidential hopeful who claimed to be a Reagan conservative or a Bush conservative, answered in Reagan's favor by a margin of 79 percent to 3 percent. Pollster Tony Fabrizio commented on this lopsided result, "Sorry Mr. President, this movement is still Ronald Reagan's."

But even the more loyal acolytes admit that there is a bit of fantasy mixed into the reminiscences. "[Republicans] are looking for somebody that resembles more clearly what they remember the Reagan era to be," said Gary Bauer, the former White House aide.

The hero-worship of Reagan would have embarrassed the man himself. Icons of his face still adorn t-shirts, touting his eponymous "Revolution." Reagan aphorisms—"I paid for this microphone"—are tossed around at conservative gatherings like movie catchphrases. They don't have to mean anything; they invoke his presence, reminding Republicans of the good times. College Republicans—many born after Reagan left office—make pilgrimages with the Young America's Foundation to his home in California where, according to a pamphlet, they will discover that the "very essence of his character is found here at the Ranch—his humility, his idealism, his diligence and hard work." After a private tour, Pat Perrot of Northridge, California, wrote, "All five of us in our party have traveled widely throughout the world but none of us remember visiting any place that had such an enormous impact on our hearts

and spirits as President Reagan's beloved ranch." Come to learn about history, leave transformed by his essence. It's not just a ranch—it's a shrine.

There are, of course, many reasons to esteem Reagan. His conservative credentials heading into 1980 were impeccable. While campaigning for Goldwater in 1964, he delivered his famous "A Time for Choosing" speech, which remains a perfect artifact of Cold-War era conservatism: a blistering assault on high taxation, a dramatization of the struggle between individualism and totalitarianism, and an attack on ineffective federal programs aimed at helping farmers and ameliorating poverty. When elected governor of California on the promise to "send the welfare bums back to work," Reagan froze state hiring and balanced the budget in his first term. Two years later, he became the head of a "Stop Nixon" movement put on by the conservative wing of his party, netting 600 delegates. His run for the presidential nomination in 1976, challenging incumbent Gerald Ford, catalyzed the New Right institutions that helped elect him four years later.

Reagan's brand of optimistic conservatism was particularly well suited to the era in which he lived. In the 1970s, the American economy suffered double-digit inflation and recession and an energy crisis. The Soviet Union made advances into Afghanistan, and the response from Washington was to lamely boycott the Moscow Olympics. Carter summed up a national mood in



his infamous “malaise speech,” declaring that the nation suffered also from a “a crisis of confidence.”

Reagan answered each of these challenges with some bit of conservative wisdom. He slashed taxes to stimulate the economy. He implemented an ambitious increase in defense spending that manifested his Cold War philosophy: “We win, they lose.” He radiated the national self-confidence that Carter feared was lost. Most candidates seeking conservative support treat the Right like a special-interest group, whose issues have to be checked off. Reagan’s greatness and value to the movement was that he had internalized much of its philosophy and principles and brought them to bear on the great issues of his time. He knew how to govern as a conservative in his time. Worthy of admiration? Yes. Worship? No.

By contrast, Thompson’s pre-presidential campaign record isn’t so congenial to conservatives. From 1975 to 1992, he worked as a Beltway lobbyist, even registering as a foreign agent to represent Toyota’s business interests in the capital. A former influence peddler seems an unlikely standard bearer for a small government movement, especially after the Abramoff scandals. His support for campaign finance reform may mitigate that fact, but cuts into support from conservatives who believe it violates the First Amendment. As a senator, he did not distinguish himself as a champion of any major conservative fiscal, social, or foreign-policy cause. He didn’t even vote to impeach Bill Clinton. “While Thompson may play a Reagan Republican on television, his real-life record is that of a lazy man’s John McCain,” wrote *Rolling Stone*’s Tim Dickerson. Yet without officially announcing his intentions, Thompson leads the Republican pack in the latest primary polls.

His popularity among conservatives derives in part from the Right’s despera-

tion to find appealing packaging for conservatism—whatever the contents. But as George Will recently challenged his readers: “ask yourself this: If he did not look like a basset hound who had just read a sad story—say, ‘Old Yeller’—and if he did not talk like central casting’s idea of the god Sincerity, would anyone think he ought to be entrusted with the nation’s nuclear arsenal?”

The modern conservative movement has always relied on striking personalities to deliver its message. Bill Buckley outfitted *National Review* with some of the finest thinkers of his day, but its success owed at least as much to frequent television appearances in which his cool demeanor and witty *bon mots* won many followers and imitators. Reagan’s genial manner and his gentle ribbing of “folks in Washington” made his reform-minded medicine go down easy. But the candidacy of Fred Thompson invites a warning: a personality may help carry ideas, but it is not a substitute for them.

When a product is outdated, the only thing left is its brand-appeal, and Thompson, recognizing that no one has taken up the Reagan brand, is claiming it for himself. First he benefited from the lazy journalistic comparisons between himself and the original actor-turned-conservative pol. Then he traveled to England, seeking photo-ops with Reagan’s Cold War counterpart, Margaret Thatcher. Now, as he campaigns in Iowa and New Hampshire, his speeches rely on rhetoric lifted from the ’80s: praising tax cuts, free trade, a strong defense, and “common sense.”

But the ’80s were a long time ago. And nostalgia can’t mask the fact that the conservative movement’s ideals, as formulated during the Cold War and embodied in the person of Reagan, are obsolete in the first decade of the new century. The Right faces an entirely new set of questions: With the threat of Soviet Communism gone, what should a

conservative foreign policy be? Having made no significant reductions in the size and scope of government, should the party of the Right now confront Leviathan, as it tried with the Contract with America, or accommodate it, as it attempted with compassionate conservatism?

The Right also confronts a series of challenges that didn’t exist when the movement was formed or when Reagan was in office, such as whether their powerful ally, big business, is really a friend of economic freedom or even compatible with promoting traditional values. There is a marketing problem, too. The Cold War allowed the conservative movement to easily tap into the political language of Americans: freedom, rugged individualism, and risk. Today’s pressing issues—mass immigration and multiculturalism—have made it painfully obvious that conservatives haven’t developed a vocabulary with which to articulate and defend their instincts about American identity and allegiance. So far, they’ve barely tried.

Thompson has shown no sign of having identified these issues, either as a senator or unannounced presidential candidate. Instead, he relies on the eagerness of the conservative movement to relive the Reagan glory days.

For the Right to find a champion, it must confront today’s problems. Reagan found success in meeting the challenges of his time; Thompson has found success in meeting the absence of a Reagan. But the ground on which conservatives battle has shifted, and Thompson is seeking enlistment in a war that has been over for nearly two decades. In lining up behind him, the Right risks substituting nostalgia for judgment and artifice for substance.

If conservatives insist on living for yesterday, history will surely forget them tomorrow. ■

# Dream of a Busboy Army

The Pentagon looks south of the border to fill its ranks.

By William Norman Grigg

IN THE ONGOING immigration debate, amnesty supporters have found an unlikely ally in the Pentagon. Tucked into the most recent version of the comprehensive immigration reform act is a provision that would make it easier for the military to recruit children of illegal immigrants by offering the prospect of expedited citizenship for their family members.

Section 614 of the bill—the “Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors” or “DREAM Act”—would encourage undocumented residents of military age to enlist with the promise of a favorable “adjustment” in their citizenship status following an honorable discharge. The measure, originally sponsored by Utah Republican Sen. Orrin Hatch, would also make it easier for illegal immigrants to qualify for in-state college tuition and grant a six-year conditional permanent resident status to those seeking to attend college.

To qualify for that provision, illegal immigrants must have originally entered the U.S. prior to age 16, have five years of continuous residency here, and have earned a high-school diploma or its equivalent. Enlistment in the military would offer a fast track to full citizenship.

“In other words,” summarizes Bill Carr, acting deputy undersecretary of defense for military personnel policy, “if you had come across [the U.S. border] with your parents, yet you were a minor child and have been in the U.S. school system for a number of years, then you could be eligible to

enlist. And at the end of that enlistment, then you would be eligible to become a citizen.”

There are an estimated 750,000 illegal U.S. residents of military age. Ten percent of that figure would equal a full year’s quota of military recruits. The Washington-based Migration Policy Institute estimates that 280,000 illegal immigrants would meet the qualifications set by the DREAM Act and suggests that the lure of “college tuition and job training benefits”—as well as the prospect of helping family members obtain citizenship—would prompt “a significant share” of that population to enlist.

In a sense, the DREAM Act would serve as the Pentagon’s equivalent of the proposed guest-worker program. Its antecedent, a July 3, 2002 Bush executive order offering “expedited naturalization for aliens and non-citizen nationals” who enlist in the U.S. military, was viewed that way south of the border. Writing in *La Opinion*, the largest Spanish-language daily newspaper in the United States, Pilar Marrero describes the reaction to that executive order in Mexico: “Believing this was their chance to cross the border legally, hundreds of Mexicans started showing up at the US Embassy in Mexico to offer to fight for the United States in exchange for American citizenship. They were turned away, disappointed that they were required to cross the border first, become a legal resident and then enlist in the military...” The DREAM Act would remove those obstacles to those already here illegally.

According to the Pentagon, there are presently some 35,000 non-citizens serving in the military, with roughly 8,000 signing up to serve each year. Since 9/11, notes the *Washington Post*, “26,000 green-card soldiers have become naturalized—more than 70 of them posthumously.” And even though military recruitment continues to sputter and stall in the population at large, it remains brisk in the Latino population.

“What we have seen is, really, in all three ethnic groups [white, black, and Hispanic] a declining propensity to join,” explains Gen. James T. Conway, commandant of the Marine Corps. But Pentagon figures obtained by the Associated Press show that Latino military enlistment in all four services has grown since the Iraq War began in 2003—from 27,000 to 33,000. By way of contrast, black enlistment has declined 38 percent since 2001.

The Pentagon has done what it can to boost recruitment: it has hired more recruiters, spent huge sums on advertising, lowered enlistment standards (accepting recruits with criminal records and poor test scores and without high-school diplomas), and raised the enlistment age to 42. Yet it is increasingly difficult for the services to meet their recruitment quotas—and merely reaching those goals isn’t enough. Politicians on both sides of the aisle consistently call for expanding the military by at least 100,000 men. At least 30,000 additional troops are needed just to carry out the Bush administration’s surge in Iraq. In the midst of this manpower crunch, the

Pentagon—the agency we would expect to defend our borders—has become one of the most powerful voices for amnesty.

The eagerness of the foreign-policy elite to promote democracy through military force abroad has clearly outstripped the enthusiasm of the American public for paying the inevitable costs. Rather than abandoning the crusade, some think-tank commandos recommend that Washington begin actively recruiting foreigners to fight its imperial wars. Max Boot, senior fellow for national security studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, is the most prominent advocate of that policy, and while he thinks the DREAM Act is a good first step, he insists that it doesn't go far enough.

In a Feb. 24, 2005 *Los Angeles Times* column, Boot declared that the military should open its ranks “not only to legal immigrants but also to illegal ones and, as important, to untold numbers of young men and women who are not here now but would like to come. No doubt many would be willing to serve for some set period in return for one of the world's most precious commodities—US citizenship. Open up recruiting stations from Budapest to Bangkok, Cape Town to Cairo, Montreal to Mexico City.”

More than 2 billion people live in South Asia, Africa, Latin America, Europe, and East Asia, where English is commonly spoken, Boot points out. And since “tens of millions of [them] reach military age each year,” he continues, “there should be no shortage of volunteers” for enlistment in his envisioned global army. Boot's grand vision is that of a unit

whose enlisted ranks would be composed entirely of non-Americans, led by US officers and NCOs. Call it the Freedom Legion. As its

name implies, this unit would be modeled on the French Foreign Legion, except, again, US citizenship would be part of the ‘pay.’ And rather than fighting for US security writ small—the way the Foreign Legion fights for the glory of France—it would have as its mission defending and advancing freedom across the world. It would be, in effect, a multinational force under US command—but one that wouldn't require the permission of France, Germany or the United Nations to deploy.

In a subsequent essay, the Russian-born Boot addressed critics who “invoke the specter of mercenaries leading to the fall of the US as they supposedly led to the fall of Rome. That's a misreading of Roman history. As classicist Victor Davis Hanson points out, by the 1st century AD, the legions ‘were mostly non-Italian and mercenary, and the empire still endured for nearly another 500 years.’ If only the Pax Americana were to last half as long!”

What Boot and Hanson overlook is the fact that the polyglot, mercenary Roman force they extol served an empire held together by force rather than a republic ruled by law—a fact both understood and lamented by some of the greatest Roman statesmen even before the dawn of the Christian Era.

“Ever since we ventured beyond our native soil, crossed the water, set foot on many islands and continents, and filled the whole sea and the whole earth with our name and power, we have experienced nothing but ill fortune,” observed Maecenas, an intimate adviser to Octavian, shortly after the battle of Actium (as recorded by historian Cassius Dio). “At first it was only at home and without our own walls that we split into factions and quarreled with one another, but later we introduced this

sickness even into the army. For this reason our city, like a great merchant vessel, manned with a crew of every race but lacking a pilot, has now for many generations continued to roll and plunge as it drifted here and there in a heavy sea.”

By then it was impossible to restore the republic, Maecenas sadly advised Octavian, “for her timbers are rotten and she will not be able to hold out much longer.” So Octavian—under the name of Augustus Caesar—abolished the republic in everything but name, while continuing to build the multinational military establishment seen by Max Boot and his colleagues as a model for their Freedom Legion.

Creation of the Freedom Legion, Boot insists, is necessary because the “beleaguered American military ... is simply too small for the tasks it has been handed.” This is true only if we assume that it is the job of the U.S. military to provide stability to a globe-spanning empire much larger than those of Rome and Great Britain—two powers that likewise came to depend heavily on foreign mercenaries to carry out imperial errands their native-born populations weren't eager to do.

Perhaps only somebody who sees American citizenship as a “commodity” could forget the words spoken by Washington shortly before crossing the Delaware River on Christmas 1776: “Put none but Americans on guard tonight.” Washington's patriots then attacked and defeated a large and well-supplied force of German mercenaries in Trenton, New Jersey, resulting in a victory that saved the cause of American independence.

Empires rely on foreign mercenaries—or illegal aliens—as military recruits. Independent republics do not. ■

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# Arts & Letters

## FILM

[A Mighty Heart]

### Judge Not, Entertain Not

By Steve Sailer

THIRTY SECONDS into Angelina Jolie's explanatory voiceover that opens "A Mighty Heart," the critically acclaimed film about the pregnant wife of the *Wall Street Journal* reporter who was kidnapped and beheaded by Muslim terrorists in Pakistan, the dozen corn-rowed young men sitting near me got up, put on their gang-colors jackets, and filed out of the theater to go find something more entertaining to watch.

Who was right about "A Mighty Heart"—the Critics or the Crips?

After Angelina Jolie first surfaced playing a lesbian junkie supermodel who dies of AIDS in 1998's "Gia," she stood out from Hollywood's fungible ranks of blonde and bland starlets by being dark and demented. After lurid years of soul-kissing her brother and wearing a vial of then-husband Billy Bob Thornton's blood around her neck, Jolie has been trying to recast herself as a globe-trotting humanitarian, a sexy Albert Schweitzer. Not surprisingly, she has brought the same energy she once devoted to playing with knives to adopting children from different countries.

Jolie's first attempt to embody her newfound ideals in a film, her 2003 tribute to international relief workers, the romantic drama "Beyond Borders," was

a respectful snore. Now she's trying again in a much-acclaimed performance as the saintly Mariane Pearl, a French radio journalist whose bestselling memoir recounted her four heartbreaking weeks in 2002 trying to piece together clues to her husband's disappearance, until a video emerged of his head being hacked off.

Ever since, her father-in-law, UCLA professor Judea Pearl, has tirelessly promoted his son as the Anne Frank of the 21st century, recruiting Bill Clinton for the Honorary Board of his Daniel Pearl Foundation that promotes "cross-cultural understanding." A competing film project based on the insufferable French intellectual Bernard-Henri Levy's book *Who Killed Daniel Pearl?*, with Josh Lucas as the martyred reporter, has been announced, but Jolie's movie won the race to the screen.

Giving "A Mighty Heart" a bad review seems churlish, since the film is so factual that any harping might appear to reflect upon the poor widow. Nonetheless, the critics were wrong and the gangbangers right: this police procedural is one of the more futile films in memory.

Mrs. Pearl says, "To me, it's a story about Danny being held by extremely intolerant people. And yet we, in that house in Pakistan—Christian, Hindu, Jew, Buddhist, Muslim—came together to find him."

But failed badly. While we can admire the film's refusal to pretend that the Pakistani and American investigators ever came close to rescuing Daniel Pearl, its lack of suspense makes for a pointless 100 minutes.

And then there are the colorless characters. I still have no idea who the "Mighty Heart" of the film's title is supposed to be. Pearl appears to have been

a nice guy and a dedicated professional who died bravely, but he never claimed to be an oversized personality. Newspapersmen were once, according to "His Girl Friday," sozzled misanthropes too crude to remove their hats while pounding out copy on their Underwoods, but modern reporters, like Mr. and Mrs. Pearl, tend to be sober and self-effacing. Indeed, this murder mystery isn't much interested in the victim, as illustrated by the casting of the obscure Dan Futterman opposite Jolie.

The film's focus on Mariane Pearl might suggest she's the mighty heart. Yet the emotionally restrained Mrs. Pearl, who meditates in front of her personal Buddhist shrine to maintain her inner harmony during her ordeal, doesn't make much of an impression either. She's too culturally sensitive to vent her wrath against the men who slaughtered her husband.

Although widely praised for not chewing the scenery, Jolie, who studied method acting and won her Oscar for playing a sociopath mental patient in "Girl, Interrupted," lacks the theatrical training that Helen Mirren used to subtly delineate an undemonstrative character in "The Queen." So we're left with plenty of time to admire the elegant curve of Jolie's profile from her eyebrows down to the tip of her nose.

Nor does the movie teach much. Pakistan is an astonishingly complex and potentially crucial country, but the filmmakers are so loathe to stereotype that all we learn about the place is that it's really crowded.

Ultimately, the tedium of "A Mighty Heart" is due to the devotion of all involved to the modern religion of non-judgmentalism. ■

Rated R solely for language. The beheading is not portrayed on film.



## BOOKS

[*The Dangerous Book for Boys*,  
Conn and Hal Iggulden,  
HarperCollins, 288 pages]

# Giving Boys Their Mischief— and Manhood

By Marian Kester Coombs

DISCLOSURE-CUM-DISCLAIMER: as a middle-aged, middle-class female, I am the natural enemy of the Boy, the one who torments him to sit still, stop talking, pay attention, have a seat, quit fidgeting, and behave. Yet I am full of compassion for his plight even as I pester him to act like a girl. It's as a fond if baffled fan of boys and men that I approached *The Dangerous Book for Boys*, created by British brothers Conn and Hal Iggulden to be the book they had craved as lads.

And a handsome book it is indeed—hardbound, printed in strong fonts, and illustrated with bold, old-fashioned graphics, photographs, and diagrams. The concept was so delectably clever that the brothers finally “had to avoid telling anyone else about the book for fear of the extra chapters.” The usual chorus of “What about a book for *girls*?” got the Igguldens’ reply—surely the understatement of the brave new century—that “there are other books for girls.” The authors continue, “The occasional girl [may be] interested in this stuff, but on the whole, boys are more interested in the use of urine as secret ink than girls are.” Nationality has been accommodated, though, with British, American, Canadian, and Australian editions already published and others in the works.

The book has roughly seven general themes or categories. “Questions About the World” answers basic queries like,

“What is a vacuum?” and “How do ships sail against the wind?” Other nature topics include “Fossils,” “Insects and Spiders,” “Light,” and “The Moon.” “Famous Battles” is just that, from Thermopylae to Gettysburg. “Extraordinary Stories” are portraits of individual courage and perseverance such as Robert the Bruce, Scott of the Antarctic, the Wright brothers, and Douglas Bader, a World War II ace who had lost both legs in an earlier flying accident, but went on to record more than 22 kills in the Battle of Britain and as a POW made so many escape attempts from Colditz Castle that the Germans finally confiscated his artificial legs.

Also included are essential documents: the Declaration of Independence, “Seven Poems Every Boy Should Know,” Latin phrases, key lines from Shakespeare, the Ten Commandments, the Seven Wonders of the World both ancient and modern. Instructions: how to play poker, chess, marbles, stickball; how to make paper airplanes, go-karts, tree houses, water bombs, timers and tripwires, electromagnets, bows and arrows, periscopes, pinhole cameras. Occult lore: card and coin tricks, codes, secret inks, girls (“If you see a girl in need of help—unable to lift something, for example—do not taunt her.”) Skills: skipping stones, teaching dogs tricks, knot-tying, catching and cooking rabbits, tanning hides, first aid.

## BABY BOOMERS HAD GROWN UP IN NEIGHBORHOODS WHERE THESE CHILDHOOD TRADITIONS WERE STILL PASSED OSMOTICALLY FROM KID TO KID.

Skipping stones? It's tough to imagine a kid needing (or wanting) to learn that art from a book. (I'm surprised they didn't include that most proprietary of boy-skills: putting out the fire from a distance...) It does not tend to be books that children turn to for inspiration but other children and the occasional louche or loose cannon of an adult (quirky aunts or ne'er-do-well uncles serve admirably). Still, adventure stories by Zane Grey, John Buchan, Kipling, and

Stevenson were long staples of boyhood reading, along with books on woodcraft by the likes of Ernest Thompson Seton and periodicals like *Boy's Life*, which began publication in 1911 and became the official Boy Scout magazine.

In fact, the book the Iggulden brothers craved has existed in many forms—it's simply no longer in print. When I first had children and went looking for my own childhood favorites like Alice Turner Curtis (the “Little Maid of” series), *The Brimful Book*, the incomparable *Journeys Through Bookland*, the “Childcraft” series of 16 World Books for children, G.A. Henty, V.M. Hillyer, even Lois Lenski, the county media specialist explained to me their disappearance from library shelves: “Kids today find these books boring and will not read them.” I went on to locate them in thrift shops, yard sales, and secondhand bookstores, as well as in the collection my parents had saved.

A few years ago, when bookstore shelves started to feature volumes on hopscotch, cat's cradle, jump-rope rhymes, Mother Goose verses and their “meaning,” and street games like Ringaleevio, Red Rover, and Boston Bulldog, it was not a good sign. The baby boomers had for the most part grown up in neighborhoods where these immemorial childhood traditions were still passed osmotically from kid to kid, but the boomers knew their boob-intubated offspring were

not growing up that way. So they decided to rectify that while making a buck off their own guilty nostalgia.

It is too much to ask that Christianity be included to the degree it actually deserves historically and culturally, but the Igguldens should have acknowledged their more immediate and relevant inspiration, the Boy Scout movement itself. (This is a little odd since scouting touted the very model of English boyhood.)

Sir Robert Baden-Powell was a military intelligence officer who in 1899 published *Aids to Scouting*, a reconnaissance manual for soldiers operating solo behind enemy lines. The Boer War allowed him to battle-test his theories; during the 217-day siege of Mafeking, Baden-Powell organized underage British troops into an effective cadet corps that freed up more seasoned troops for combat.

Hailed as a hero back in England, Baden-Powell discovered his recon manual had become a runaway best-seller among boys. Concerned, as were many in that earnest, innocent age, that Britain's imperial affluence was coddling youth into soft, tame weaklings, he set about researching a sequel focused on general nature-craft, *Scouting for Boys*. Socialite friends of his owned barren Brownsea Island in Poole Harbor off Dorset's southern coast,

where at an encampment exactly 100 years ago this August, ten working-class boys and ten public-school boys formed the first Boy Scout troop, with electrifying results. Within three years, scouting had surged into a movement of tens of thousands in more than a score of nations—a fertile cross between a paramilitary and the German back-to-nature group *Wandervogel*.

What is now happening to the Boy Scouts tracks is what has happened to boyhood, and to manhood for that matter, over the century past. The fatal weakness has advanced apace. As the ranks of the “brave, clean, and reverent” are depleted, the social environment grows more and more depraved, which in turn further stunts the growth of “good scouts.”

The situation is not unlike that faced by other species on the verge of extinction. You can catalogue them and even keep their gametes on ice in zoo banks, but if the habitat that once made sense and use of their genetic heritage is gone, they can no longer be said to exist. Rilke's “Panther”—which describes a once mighty beast caged—springs to mind:

The easy motion of his supple stride,  
which turns about the very  
smallest circle,  
is like a dance of strength about  
a center  
in which a mighty will stands  
stupefied.

On Sept. 11, 2001, the one hijacked plane that did not find its mark was brought down by a band of ordinary men armed only with the heroism of despair. When the state goes off its rocker, as it periodically does, the “little platoons” of civil society alone can set our lives in vital order once again. The boys who will grow into the men to lead these heroic platoons are indeed dangerous—and endangered. ■

*Marian Kester Coombs writes from Crofton, Md.*

[*Containment: Rebuilding a Strategy Against Global Terror*, Ian Shapiro, Princeton University Press, 208 pages]

## Containing the Bush Doctrine

By Michael C. Desch

IAN SHAPIRO, the Sterling professor of political science at Yale University and director of the MacMillan Center for International and Area Studies, is a man skeptical of doctrinaire thinking, whether in the academy or in government. In *Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory*, a groundbreaking book he wrote with his colleague Donald Greene in 1994, Shapiro challenged the overly ambitious claims of proponents of this approach who attempted to reduce political science to the assumptions of economics and the logic of mathematics.

In his latest book, *Containment: Rebuilding a Strategy Against Global Terror*, Shapiro turns his critical eye from dogmatic thinking in the ivory tower to the Bush administration's doctrine of unilateral and offensive war against world terrorism. He rejects the president's claim that the war on terror can only be won by going on the attack, hunting down terrorists around the globe, toppling the dictators and rogue regimes that abet them, and implanting democracies in their place. Rather, he argues that the Cold War strategy of containment, suitably updated, not only provides a better strategy for winning the war, but is also more compatible with our own democratic values and institutions here at home.

This is a reasonable argument—particularly in light of the fact that the Bush administration's approach is clearly not succeeding in Iraq. The much-touted surge seems thus far to be producing only a surge in American casualties. Afghanistan, which once seemed the poster child for the Bush Doctrine, now

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teeters on the brink of chaos, with the Taliban resurgent and our NATO allies increasingly skittish. The Taliban's old ally al-Qaeda—incomprehensibly still led by Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri almost six years after 9/11—remains active around the world, from the caves of the Hindu Kush to the streets of Londonistan. Furthermore, you do not have to be a doctrinaire libertarian to fear that the Bush administration's methods in the war on terror seriously impinge on our liberties.

It's clearly time for a new strategy—or more accurately, a return to a tried and true approach—and Shapiro's call for a greater realism in American foreign policy in the “long war” is worth heeding. Containment, in Shapiro's formulation, is an approach to protecting American national security that, first, does not depend upon U.S. military supremacy, but rather relies on the combined power of allies and the natural advantages of staying on the defense. Second, a containment policy would be discriminant, not global, in the assessment of what interests we need to actively defend. Shapiro makes a compelling case that such as strategy is more likely to succeed in managing the threat from international terrorism without alienating the rest of the world through unilateralism and undermining our democratic political system at home. Given the sensibility of his proposal and how few fellow travelers we have in the campaign to steer American foreign policy in a more sensible direction, I ought to rest content with a fulsome endorsement of the book.

But because Shapiro aims both to analyze the sources of the Bush Doctrine as well as nudge the next administration in a different direction, it is important to ask whether his diagnosis of the problem—Republican intellectual hegemony due to a the Democrats' lack of ideas—is sound and his prescription—a Democratic president animated by a new approach—is feasible. On both counts, I am skeptical.

The root of the problem, in Shapiro's reading, is that after 9/11 only the Bush

administration and its neoconservative allies offered a coherent worldview that both explained why the attacks on the United States occurred—“they hate us because we're free”—and provided the core idea for future policies to prevent a repetition of them—“go on the offensive to spread democracy in the Middle East.”

In Shapiro's view, the Democrats suffered from a complete intellectual deficit. As late as the 2004 presidential campaign, when it was already clear to many Americans that the Bush approach to Iraq was failing, the best that Democratic candidate John Kerry could offer was a tactical critique—that we should have waited for another Security Council resolution so we could have waged the campaign against Saddam's tyranny multilaterally—rather than a fundamentally different approach to the war on terror.

Shapiro attributes the Democrats' supine stance *vis-à-vis* the Bush Doctrine to three factors. First, given the shock of 9/11 and the sense of siege gripping the country, he believes the Democrats were wary of challenging the wartime commander in chief. Second, since the Democratic Party has been, at least since George McGovern, the party of anti-militarism, Shapiro argues, rea-

ness after 9/11 and in the run up to the Iraq War, but his portrayal of the Democrats as a strategic *tabula rasa* is misleading. The problem is not that the Democrats lacked an overall strategy for the global war on terror but rather that they had one that differed surprisingly little from the Bush Doctrine.

Shapiro points to six characteristics of the Bush Doctrine that he thinks mark it as a radical departure from “prior American national security policy.” These include its global reach, its unilateral orientation, its embrace of preemptive war, its commitment to regime change, its stark “you're either with us or against us” view of the world, and its pessimistic outlook towards the future. I think that Shapiro overstates the distinctiveness of many of these elements from what came before.

As Tony Smith documents in his fine book *America's Mission*, our country has always viewed itself as having a duty to mankind, not only to our own citizens. Similarly, unilateralism is not unique to the Bush administration. Even Woodrow Wilson, the godfather of the League of Nations, acted unilaterally in the Western Hemisphere on many occasions. Nor is preemptive war a new weapon in the U.S. arsenal, as historian

AS LATE AS THE **2004 PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN**, WHEN IT WAS ALREADY CLEAR TO MANY AMERICANS THAT **THE BUSH APPROACH TO IRAQ WAS FAILING**, THE BEST THAT DEMOCRATIC CANDIDATE JOHN KERRY COULD OFFER WAS **A TACTICAL CRITIQUE**.

sonably, that many Democrats were unwilling to think seriously about strategy and other things military. Finally, Shapiro argues that the rise of the Democratic Leadership Council, which played a key role in Bill Clinton's successful triangulation strategy in the 1990s, led the party to think that effective tactics could substitute for sound principles in the struggle for the White House.

Shapiro is correct that these factors contributed to the Democrats' weak-

Marc Trachtenberg documents in his recent article in *Security Studies*, and suspicion of neutralism was bipartisan during the Cold War. Furthermore, a commitment to regime change has actually been a consistent thread running through much of American post-Cold War foreign policy and best demonstrates the continuity of the Bush Doctrine with the foreign policy of previous administrations.

In both the Clinton and Bush eras, there has been a consensus around the

notion that spreading democracy is the key to ensuring America's security, and therefore democracy promotion should be the centerpiece of American foreign policy. A colleague of mine who worked for both the Clinton and Bush administrations (and had a hand in drafting the key foreign-policy statements of both, "The National Security Strategy of the United States") regularly reminds critics of the Bush Doctrine of this fact. There is, to be sure, a subtle tactical difference: the Clinton administration leaned toward a more multilateral bent, while the Bush administration has been more willing to go it alone if necessary. But this should not obscure the fact that for many Democrats, Bush's emphasis on democracy promotion was music to their ears. The problem, in a nutshell, was not the dearth of ideas in the Democratic Party after 9/11; rather, it was that the Democrats were enthralled by the same set of ideas as many Republicans, and in some cases—for example, with "democratic peace theory"—they were the first to turn these ideas into policy.

IN BOTH THE **CLINTON AND BUSH ERAS**, THERE HAS BEEN A CONSENSUS AROUND THE NOTION THAT **SPREADING DEMOCRACY IS THE KEY TO ENSURING AMERICA'S SECURITY**, AND THEREFORE DEMOCRACY PROMOTION SHOULD BE THE CENTERPIECE OF **AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY**.

In important respects, regime change had been the Democratic strategy for post-Cold War American foreign policy since the early 1990s. For example, beginning soon after the first Gulf War and continuing through the 2000 presidential campaign, it was Al Gore whose voice was among the loudest in calling for the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and regime change in Iraq. As mentioned earlier, in the 2004 presidential campaign, Kerry did not offer a fundamentally different strategy for waging the war terror because he simply did not have one. Not surprisingly, in outlining his foreign-policy philosophy in April,

Democratic presidential candidate Barack Obama returned to familiar themes: "I dismiss the cynics who say that this new century cannot be another when, in the words of President Franklin Roosevelt, we lead the world in battling immediate evils and promoting the ultimate good."

This is not just a matter of quibbling about the intellectual paternity of the Bush Doctrine. It cuts to the heart of whether Shapiro is right that a change of party in 2008 will herald a significant change in course for the nation. Shapiro thinks that if the Democratic Party adopts a principled foreign-policy agenda, it is possible that containment can become the heart of America's strategy for the global war on terror. But unless the Democratic Party also gives up its commitment to regime change and global transformation (the logical implications of democratic peace theory), it is unlikely to embrace containment. Containment, which has historically been linked with the realist approach to American foreign policy, requires a very different view of how

the world works than that which the Democratic and Republican parties have had since the end of the Cold War. In order to return to the containment approach, the next president—whether Democrat or Republican—will have to undertake a much more radical intellectual reorientation than I fear Shapiro recognizes. ■

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[*Prophet of Innovation: Joseph Schumpeter and Creative Destruction*, Thomas K. McCraw, Belknap/Harvard University Press, 719 pages]

## Ambivalent Prophet of Capitalism

By Daniel McCarthy

WHEN THE HARVARD economist Joseph Schumpeter was writing what would become his best-known work, *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*, in the 1930s, capitalism appeared to be living on borrowed time. Already in 1921, the one-time muckraker Lincoln Steffens had spoken for advanced opinion in saying, after returning from a trip to the USSR, "I have been over into the future, and it works." The worldwide depression of the next decade seemed to prove the point. Capitalism was due for the dustbin; the future belonged to socialism, just as Marx had predicted. Even John Maynard Keynes, by his own lights a defender of capitalism, agreed that it was an economic system grown old and feeble, in need of managed care. His was a vision of "capitalism in the oxygen tent," as Schumpeter put it.

On the surface, *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy* might seem inspired by the dour spirit of the times. Schumpeter began the second section of his book by asking, "Can capitalism survive?" and promptly answered, "No. I do not think it can." That was what he wrote, but it wasn't what he meant. *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy* is a book rich in deliberate irony—Schumpeter's reaction to the monolithic pessimism of Keynesianism and socialism. Not that he was at all sure that capitalism would indeed survive. He was quite serious in those passages of the book that warned of capitalism's suicidal tendencies—its creation of a hostile class of intellectuals and its corrosive effects on



its own pre-capitalist foundations, especially the family. But as an economic system, capitalism still outstripped its rivals, and Schumpeter explained why—because of a never-ending process he called “creative destruction.”

Today the phrase has become a much-abused cliché. Neoconservative journalist Michael Ledeen appropriated the term for his description of the destruction of Arab lives and cities in order to create a compliant and democratic Middle East. Seismographers might register the late economist’s reaction to this on the Richter scale as he spins in his grave. War was the last thing Schumpeter would have endorsed: he had seen the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the milieu of his youth and early manhood, sundered by an earlier democratist crusade. Nor did Schumpeter—who hated Hitler and did all he could to help displaced Jewish and socialist scholars—later celebrate the Allies’ tactic of “area bombing” in World War II. Biographer Thomas McCraw quotes Schumpeter’s diary on this point: “Headline: ‘Every Jap City to be wiped out.’ Another headline: ‘Miles of Ruin.’ And no voice even of decent regret—they gloat over it...”

There was nothing creative about that destruction. What Schumpeter had in mind was very different: the ultimate failure of any attempt to build a business empire without end. Not only most start-ups, but all firms sooner or later—and usually sooner—are destroyed by competitors who avail themselves of innovative technologies and production methods. This constant process of economic revolution was the product of a special kind of man, not just the businessman or even the inventor, but the entrepreneur, a man of initiative and imagination (though crucially, and contrary to Marx, the capital he risks is not his own). As Schumpeter explained, an extensive system of credit is indispensable to entrepreneurship and hence capitalism.

“Creative destruction” had nothing to do with bombs or even bulldozers: Schumpeter was an old European as well as a theorist of capitalism. He had no intention of sacrificing beauty to

progress. Henry Regnery, who was once a graduate student of Schumpeter’s, recalled that in a discussion of whether socialism was more productive than capitalism, Schumpeter replied, “It all depends on what you want. If I had the choice, I would take the society that produced the cathedral at Chartres.” By his own account, Schumpeter was a conservative, and he subscribed to a kind of conservatism that meant, in his words, “the bringing about of transitions from your social structure to other social structures with a minimum of loss of human values.”

HE STYLED HIMSELF **AN ARISTOCRATIC RACONTEUR**, AND BOASTED THAT HE INTENDED TO BECOME THE **WORLD’S GREATEST ECONOMIST, LOVER, AND HORSEMAN**.

Threaded with ambivalence, contradiction, and irony, Schumpeter’s work was never salesmanship. A thinker as multifaceted as Schumpeter demands much of a biographer, and in *Prophet of Innovation: Joseph Schumpeter and Creative Destruction*, Thomas McCraw delivers. He is himself a professor at Harvard, in the business school—as McCraw points out, Schumpeter is nowadays more admired among business faculty than in economics departments—and he is a Pulitzer Prize winner for his 1984 book, *Prophets of Regulation*. He’s well-equipped to elucidate Schumpeter’s thought, though McCraw is more supportive of government intervention in the market than Schumpeter ever was. As a student in Vienna, Schumpeter had studied, alongside Ludwig von Mises, under Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk. Although not nearly as unpromising in defense of *laissez-faire* as Mises and Böhm-Bawerk, Schumpeter loathed the New Deal, and it is hard to imagine him writing as fondly as does McCraw of the Securities and Exchange Commission. But McCraw is careful not to let his differences with his subject intrude too much into what is, in fact, an exemplary biography.

A 700-page biography an economist might not sound very enticing. But McCraw not only excels at conveying

the innovation and excitement in Schumpeter’s work, he keeps readers riveted to the story of the economist’s life, and some of twists are almost novelistic. As a young professor Schumpeter fought—and won—a fencing duel with the librarian of the University of Czernowitz to win greater borrowing privileges for his students. He styled himself an aristocratic *raconteur* and was known to boast that he intended to become the world’s greatest economist, lover, and horseman. Although he was never a very good rider, he came close to

living up to his other ambitions: not only was he one of the world’s most famous economists during his lifetime (second only to Keynes), his prowess in amorous affairs was sufficiently remarkable that an ex-girlfriend once wrote to ask him for advice she might give to her inexperienced husband to make him a better bedmate. Women found Schumpeter magnetic, and the feeling was mutual. When he looked back late in life on distractions that had hampered his work, “Women” topped the list.

Yet McCraw sensitively illustrates the ways in which five women were, far from impediments, the forces that impelled Schumpeter to his success. There was first of all his beloved mother, Johanna, who not only sent him to Vienna’s best schools despite her meager means (his father had died when Schumpeter was a small boy), but also married into petty nobility to advance him socially. Social advancement also played a role in Schumpeter’s first marriage to a well-connected Englishwoman Gladys Ricard Seaver, a dozen years his senior. His years with her were bohemian—“neither he nor Gladys put much restraint on their libidinous impulses,” McCraw reports. World War I quite literally drove them apart: she had been visiting England when war broke out and found it impossible to reunite

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

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with him in Austria. As correspondence became unreliable, their practical separation became a virtual divorce.

Over time, Schumpeter fell in love with the woman who would become his second wife, and, next to his mother, mean the most to him in life—Annie Reisinger, the daughter of his concierge. When she died in childbirth less than a year after they were married, and just weeks after his mother had died, Schumpeter plunged into a depression that would last, with only periodic reprieves, for the rest of his life. He maintained his outward pose as a charming *boulevardier*, but in his diary he expressed almost constant despair and a truly religious devotion to the ghosts of his mother and wife. After their deaths, he felt all he had left was his work.

But Schumpeter was wrong, even if he did not realize it at the time. His young secretary, Mia Stöckel, was a source of solace and companionship, and it was she who tended Annie Schumpeter's grave during Joseph's sojourns to America. After he relocated to the States permanently, he eventually married again, this time to one Elizabeth Boody Firuski, an able economist in her own right and a better mathematician than her husband to boot. (All his life, Schumpeter sought to further integrate mathematics and economics, but his own mathematical skills were not adequate for the task.) Elizabeth's self-sacrificing commitment to Schumpeter made his years with her the most productive of his career. Still, no one could replace Annie, whose picture Schumpeter kept by his bedside even after he married Elizabeth.

McCraw treads lightly around anything that smacks of psychoanalysis, which is one of the virtues of his book. But he doesn't overlook the obvious correlations between Schumpeter's life and work. He had seen "creative destruction" first hand in the transformation of Austria-Hungary before World War I, and his own rise from humble origins to fame and esteem testified to the entrepreneurial virtues. Not that everything was so easy for him: in addition to the

wreckage of his personal life, he had also suffered setbacks in business and government—for a time after World War I he had been finance minister of Austria, but he was unable to tame the hyperinflation crippling the country.

Even when he was successful, as he certainly was during his Harvard years, Schumpeter's reputation sometimes exceeded his influence. He was chagrined when his 1939 work, *Business Cycles*, was eclipsed by Keynes's *General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money*, and even his own graduate students were more interested in his rival's book, which seemed to provide straightforward solutions for the Great Depression. His students certainly felt his personal influence—and they included several future Nobel laureates, among them Paul Samuelson, James Tobin, and Wassily Leontief—but he never cultivated disciples for a distinctly Schumpeterian school of thought. And ironically, considering his championing of mathematical modeling in economics, today's econometricians have little use for Schumpeter's largely historical and sociological works.

Yet in the long run his thought—or at least his catchphrases—won out. The 1990s tech-boom provided textbook examples of creative destruction and entrepreneurial action, and McCraw reports that Schumpeter is now cited more often than Keynes. This is all to the good. But as McCraw's book shows, Schumpeter's thought is too nuanced to be reduced to slogans. There's much more in his work that deserves to be rediscovered, for Schumpeter understood better than most both the workings and the discontents of modern capitalism. There is a depth to his analysis—in his integration of economics, sociology, and history—that is unmatched by anyone in the field today. The economics profession could use more Schumpeters and fewer number-crunchers and Stephen J. Levitts. For now, at least we have this outstanding biography. ■

*Daniel McCarthy is senior editor at ISI Books.*

# The Knighting of a Spoiled Brat



Americans are bad about European titles, especially British ones. And by bad, I mean good. After all, they fought a Revolutionary War in

order not to have to call, say, Bill Gates “Lord Gates,” or my old buddy Harvey Weinstein, “Sir Harvey.”

A sir is a knight, the lowest rank as far as titles are concerned, but baronets—the oldest title of all going back 800 years or so—are also addressed as “sir.” A sir could also be a lawyer who got a politician out of trouble, an athlete who has done Britain proud and has not raped or beaten up anyone, or a sleazy billionaire who has given lotsa moolah to Tony Blair. In fact, Blair has created more titles than anyone on record, sending most of them to the House of Lords after he did away with the hereditary titles that once upon a time ruled the upper House.

A couple of weeks ago, in merry old (wet and miserable) England, all hell broke loose. It was time for the queen to hand out titles to deserving civil servants and rich folk. When the list appeared, it was double-take time. Not that Salman Rushdie? Surely some mistake... But, shock horror, it was indeed that Rushdie, the bald fellow who has a beautiful Indian wife and always looks down on people. The British tabloids went ape.

Some of you may remember the last time Rushdie was in the news. It was 1989 and Khomeini had declared a *fatwa* against him. Rushdie had written another unreadable book—I challenge anyone to finish one—in which he had called the Prophet Mohammed a dirty dog and Mrs. Thatcher “Mrs. Torture.” So what happened? Mrs. Torture spent \$20 million protecting Sal baby from the zealots who wanted to collect the million-dollar

reward for his head. Pat Buchanan wrote at the time that Rushdie should go to Nicaragua and have his friends the Sandinistas protect him. I wrote that I hoped they kneecapped him but nothing more serious. Both Pat and I were abused by trendy leftists like Christopher Hitchens and Martin Amis rushing to cash in on Rushdie’s predicament.

As luck would have it, Rushdie escaped. He became a celebrity, got rid of his third wife, and collected millions for future books from crazed publishers desperate to capitalize on his notoriety. During the 1992 election in London, Rushdie was playing poker and looking

hates India and Islam. He also hates England and the English school system that bullied him as a child. Most of us would have been appreciative to have had our adopted country protect us in the manner England sheltered Rushdie. After being sentenced to death by the Ayatollah, he was given round-the-clock protection for nine years. Yet Rushdie never thanked anyone and behaved as if it was no more than his due. When in 1993, he heard Prince Charles had queried the cost of his security—Charles had also called Rushdie a second-rate writer—he wrote witheringly about “thin-lipped jingoist Britain” that had brought Indians to England “only so they could vent their feelings of racial superiority.” After ten years of state-financed protection, and after the *fatwa* was lifted, he abandoned England

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depressed because Labour was losing when great cheers could be heard from above. It was the poor slobs guarding him, the special branch, who were cheering for the Tories. Rushdie was outraged.

That’s the kind of chappie he is. The Japanese translator of *The Satanic Verses* was murdered by fanatics, as were two other people involved with the unreadable opus. Yet Rushdie has never once mentioned them, remaining in full self-pity mode throughout. That’s no surprise: he is self-important, pretentious, attention-seeking, and the most ungrateful person on earth. He was born in Mumbai, India and is a Muslim, but he

for America, where he married his fourth wife, although I hear the union is on the rocks. (Now that she’s Lady Rushdie, she might reconsider).

What is unfathomable is why Tony Blair chose to give this creep a title. It’s likely that Blair wanted to humiliate Iran for taking his sailors hostage and was stung by having to eat humble pie to get them back, so he decided to give the Islamists in Iran and Pakistan the finger by making their *bête noir* a knight. That doesn’t change the fact that Rushdie is unworthy of any honor, but hypocrite that he is, he accepted it from a country he has abused *ad nauseam*.

Arise, Sir Salman Humbug. ■



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